# THE 2017-18 BUDGET AND THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY

PRESENTATION TO A POST-BUDGET BREAKFAST HOSTED BY MOORE STEPHENS


RACV CLUB, MELBOURNE 11<sup>TH</sup> MAY 2017

### SAUL ESLAKE

### The international economic context

## The IMF upgraded its forecasts for world economic growth for the first time in $5\frac{1}{2}$ years – but continues to downgrade longer-term projections

#### Successive IMF World Economic Outlook forecasts of world real GDP growth




Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2017 and previous issues.




## Economic growth across 'advanced' economies has been consistently weaker than expected – yet unemployment has fallen sharply


## OECD area real GDP growth



### OECD area unemployment rate



### 3-year change in OECD unemployment rate









## 'Advanced' economies aren't capable of growing as rapidly as they used to


## OECD area population growth



## OECD area labour productivity growth



### OECD area potential GDP growth








## The four largest 'advanced' economies are now more or less at 'full employment'


### Four largest 'advanced' economies - unemployment

## 12 ¬% of labour force 11 Germany 10 3 Japan 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

#### Broader measures of US 'under-employment'



### **Employment-population** ratios









## Inflation looks to have passed its low point in each of the four largest 'advanced' economies — and is picking up in Asia, too


### Wage inflation – four largest 'advanced' economies



## 'Core' CPI inflation – four largest 'advanced' economies




#### Asian producer prices






## So the long down-trend in interest rates has come to an end – as bond markets began to sense from the middle of last year


### Major central bank policy interest rates



### Major central bank balance sheets



#### 10-year bond yields





### The Trump Administration's first 100 days haven't been a great success


#### **Lack of preparation**

#### Presidential appointments in the first 100 days




<sup>\*</sup>Totals include some posts that are not being tracked as 'key positions' in the appointee database. Trump data as of 3:30 p.m. on April 28, or 99 days into the presidency.

#### Lack of legislative achievements



#### Lack of detail



#### Mixed record on promises


- Conservative judge appointed to US Supreme Court
- Significant changes in environmental regulation
- Failed to repeal 'Obamacare'
- So far hasn't done much on trade
  - Has withdrawn from TPP
  - Intentions re NAFTA unclear
  - Backed away from labelling China a 'currency manipulator' or imposing across-the-board tariffs on imports from China
  - Key trade policy personnel yet to be confirmed
- Appears to have reversed campaign position on 'foreign entanglements'
  - Military strikes on Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan
  - Possible action against North Korea
  - NATO 'relevant' after all
- Nothing thus far on infrastructure spending

Sources: Center for Presidential Transition, Partnership for Public Service; The Economist; GovTrack.us; ThinkAdvisor.




## Three reasons why Trump's fiscal policies may not have the same impact on economic growth as Reagan's


#### Interest rates



#### Federal budget and debt



#### **Labour supply**









### A full-blown 'trade war' would send the US economy into recession

### Simulated changes in US real GDP under 'trade war' scenarios



### Simulated levels of US unemployment under 'trade war' scenario




Note: 'full trade war' scenario assumes US imposes 45% tariff on non-oil imports from China and 35% on non-oil imports from Mexico, and China & Mexico impose similar tariffs on imports from US. 'Aborted trade war' assumes US tariffs are imposed for only a single year, because China and Mexico concede to US demands, the US Congress overturns the action, or President Trump loses in the courts, or the public outcry is such that the administration is forced to stand down Source: Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson and Tyler Moran, 'Impact of Clinton's and Trump's Trade Policies, in Peterson Institute for International Economics, Briefing 16-6, 'Assessina Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaian', September 2016.




## China's growth has slowed a lot; it's no longer driven by net exports; and it isn't running big current account surpluses any more


#### China real GDP growth



### Contributions to Chinese real GDP growth




### Chinese current account surplus







## The monetary stimulus which revived China's property sector last year now seems to have been partially withdrawn

#### Real estate investment







#### **Steel production**




#### **Cement production**



#### **Credit growth**




#### Short term interest rates





### So the 'mini-boom' in iron ore prices now seems to be over


#### Chinese iron ore production




#### Chinese iron ore inventories



Coal spot prices



#### Chinese iron ore imports



Iron ore spot prices









### The Australian economic context

## The resources investment boom is over – but the rebound in commodity prices has pushed Australia's trade balance back into surplus


### Australia's resources investment & export volumes



## Australia's resources export prices



### Australia's merchandise trade balance



Note: Resources investment includes exploration expenditure. Sources: ABS; RBA.




## The recent rebound in commodity prices has provided a boost to national income – but it isn't going to last


# Australia's terms of trade (ratio of export to import prices)



# Gains in real income arising from changes in the terms of trade



#### Growth in real gross domestic income (GDI) vs real GDP




Note: 'The 'terms of trade' is the ratio of the implicit price deflator of exports of goods and services to the implicit price deflator of imports of goods and services. Real gross domestic income (GDI) is real gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for income gains or losses arising from changes in the terms of trade. Source: ABS.




## Much of the recent uptick in national income growth has gone to profits – but that hasn't resulted in higher investment or employment


#### Pre-tax company profits



#### **Business investment**



### Business conditions and confidence




Note: 'Other sectors' in the company profits survey exclude banks and other deposit-taking intermediaries, insurance and super funds, education & training, and health care & social assistance. Mining investment includes buildings & structures and plant, equipment & machinery from the capex survey plus exploration expenditure; investment by 'other sectors' is the national accounts measure of total new business investment minus this estimate of mining investment. Sources: ABS; National Australia Bank Monthly Business Survey.




## Employers are cautious about additional hiring, especially of full-time workers – and about granting wage increases


#### **Employer hiring intentions**




#### Full- vs part-time employment



#### Labour force under-utilization



#### **Employment growth**



#### **Unemployment rate**




#### Wage cost index






## Weak income growth and debt repayment continue to detract from growth in consumer spending


### Real household disposable income



#### Household saving rate



#### **Consumer spending**









## Housing activity is probably close to peaking – although there is still a large 'pipeline' of work yet to be completed


## Private residential building approvals, by type of dwelling



### Residential buildings under construction



### Dwellings approved but not yet commenced









## Rapid growth in demand (mainly for existing dwellings) from investors has pushed up prices and squeezed would-be home-buyers out


## Finance commitments for residential property purchases




## Capital city residential property prices



## Home ownership rates by age group







### The 2017-18 Budget


#### The 2017-18 Budget has two principal objectives

- ☐ To put as much distance as possible between the current Government and its predecessor (the Abbott Government, not the Rudd-Gillard Governments)
  - hence the abandonment of the so-called 'zombie' measures left over from the 2014 Budget, which both the Abbott
    and Turnbull Governments had been unable to get through the Senate
  - instead the path back to surplus is to be achieved with less reliance on spending cuts and more reliance on revenue increases
  - and a way has been cleared for the Government to accept the advice of the RBA, IMF, and OECD (among others)
     that borrowing for 'well-chosen' infrastructure projects can be a 'Good Thing', especially when monetary policy has reached the limits of what it can do
- ☐ To neutralize as many of the Opposition's "lines of attack" on the Government as possible, ahead of an election that must be called some time between August 2018 and May 2019
  - hence the levy on and increased regulation of banks, the tax on employers of temporary foreign workers, new taxes on foreign property investors, etc.
  - hence the efforts to 'guarantee' funding for Medicare and the NDIS, and 'Gonski 2.0'
  - the only significant points of difference on key aspects of economic policy now are negative gearing and the CGT discount, the tax cut for companies with turnover exceeding \$10mn, and the banking royal commission




## Budget deficits will be slightly larger in the next two years than previously forecast, but a surplus is still projected for 2020-21

#### 'Underlying' cash balance




#### Net debt






## The return to surplus now owes less to cuts in spending, and more to increases in revenue, than was envisaged in the 2014-15 Budget

#### **Payments**




#### **Receipts**










## Some of the economic forecasts underpinning the Budget look optimistic, particularly with regard to wages growth









#### **GDP** price deflator








#### Wages






## As a result, some of the Budget revenue forecasts could (again) prove optimistic


#### Personal income tax revenue




#### Company tax revenue



#### Capital gains tax revenue



#### **GST** revenue



## Revenue measures include Medicare levy increase, a new tax on banks, and a tax on employers of foreign workers


	\$ million					
	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	Total	
0.5 pc increase in Medicare levy		400	3,550	4,250	8,200	
Major bank 'levy'	1,600	1,500	1,500	1,600	6,200	
Levy on employers of foreign workers	90	360	390	370	1,210	
Increased CGT on foreign property investors	150	100	150	200	600	
Disallow travel expenses for property investors		160	180	200	540	
Increased visa fees	35	70	125	180	410	
Increased excise on RYO tobacco	30	70	110	150	360	
Extension of small biz instant asset write-off		-950	50	250	-650	
First home 'super saver' scheme	-50	-60	-70	-70	-250	
Other	985	1,588	1,695	2,149	6,417	
Total	2,840	3,238	7,680	9,279	23,037	

## Spending increases largely the result of abandoning 'zombie' savings left over from the 2014-15 Budget


	\$ million						
	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	Total		
Abandonment of 'zombie' savings	3,171	4,476	4,691	4,816	17,154		
Gonski 2.0	106	295	511	840	1,752		
New PBS listings	213	264	312	346	1,135		
Medicare benefits schedule indexation	10	146	403	443	1,002		
National rail program			200	400	600		
Higher education savings	-322	-764	-1,154	-1,486	-3,726		
Use of cheaper medicines	-247	-572	-572	-571	-1,962		
'Better targeting' of assistance to jobseekers	-4	-185	-216	-231	-636		
Other	1,972	1,639	-358	-3,041	212		
Total	4,899	5,299	3,817	1,516	15,531		

### The National Disability Insurance Scheme is a <u>very</u> expensive program

#### Spending on the NDIS



#### Increases in spending




Source: 2016-17 Budget Papers.



## Increased infrastructure spending – funded in part by 'good debt' – is another feature of the 2017-18 Budget

#### Commonwealth Government capital spending



- The 'budget reset' has allowed the Government to accept the advice of the RBA, the IMF and the OECD (among others) that borrowing in order to fund 'well targeted' and 'appropriately governed' infrastructure investment can be 'good policy'
- ☐ The Budget provides for almost \$51bn of capital spending in 2017-18, and \$175bn over the four years to 2020-21 ...
- ... although on current plans, the level of capital spending peaks in 2017-18
- The 'headline' infrastructure projects announced in the Budget will be funded 'offbudget' through government-owned companies (similar to the NBN)
- Not all of the proposed investments would pass the 'rigorous project assessment and program evaluation' that the Budget says should apply to 'all government spending'

Source: 2016-17 Budget Papers. Statement No. 4.




### The 'housing affordability' measures are good in parts

- ☐ The Government deserves credit for focusing on the importance of increasing the supply of affordable rental housing for low income households
  - the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation (the 'bond aggregator') will help not-for-profit affordable housing providers borrow larger amounts at lower interest rates to provide more affordable housing
  - the Government will provide some tax incentives (including a 60% CGT discount) to encourage more private investment in affordable rental housing
  - An additional \$375mn over three years from 2018-19 for homelessness programs
- ☐ The Government will put pressure on the States to improve housing supply
  - by setting housing supply targets and objectives for planning and zoning reforms
  - And providing \$1bn for investment in 'infrastructure choke points' that are impeding new housing developments
- ☐ However the proposals to improve affordability for first time buyers are unlikely to help much
  - 'Super for Housing Lite' will at best 'reshuffle the queue' of would-be buyers in favour of those who are able to take advantage of the scheme
  - but its practical effect will be similar to that of FHOGs, stamp duty concessions etc allowing people to spend more on housing than they otherwise would, which inevitably results in higher housing prices, not higher home ownership
  - the 'downsizing' incentives will not appeal to many people
  - it's such a pity the Government won't move on the CGT discount




## Preferencing small business – through the taxation system or in other ways – isn't going to boost employment or innovation


### Employment and employment growth by business size



#### Business innovation, by business size



% of businesses introducing new or significantly improved -



Operational processes

Organizational processes







#### Summary

#### ☐ The world economy does seem to be picking up a bit

- but governments, central banks and investors are still coming to grips with the long-term slowdown in <u>potential</u> growth stemming from demographic change and slower productivity growth
- 'policy surprises' out of the US and a credit/property crunch in China are potential sources of downside risk

#### ☐ The Australian economy is still 'treading water' in the aftermath of the end of the mining boom

- the 'mini-commodity boom' of the past year is now fading, while housing investment is approaching a peak
- businesses remain hesitant about new investment and permanent job creation, while households remain hesitant about spending

#### ☐ The 2017-18 Budget aims to 're-position' the Turnbull Government politically

- drawing a clear distinction from the Abbott Government, and neutralizing many of the Opposition's principle lines of attack
- the path back to surplus now relies more on higher revenue and less on lower spending
- while that reduces the legislative risks to getting back to surplus, there are still some risks around the economic forecasts
- borrowing for infrastructure spending is only 'good' if the infrastructure projects themselves are 'good'
- the housing affordability measures won't do much, if anything, to improve housing affordability for would-be home-buyers, although it might help low-income renters a bit

