

# Is the Australian property market in 'bubble trouble'?

Presentation to  
ANZ Queensland customers

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
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
*economics@ANZ*

# Residential property prices have risen rapidly in absolute terms and relative to incomes

## House prices




## House prices relative to average annual earnings




Sources: REIA; ABS; Economics@ANZ.

# Rising property prices have been accompanied (driven?) by rapid growth in personal borrowing

## Borrowing by individuals for housing




## Household debt as a p.c. of disposable income




Sources: RBA; ABS; Economics@ANZ.

# Gains in housing wealth has been a key reason for the resilience of the Australian economy

## Australian household net wealth




## Household net wealth and saving




Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ. 'Net wealth' is assets minus liabilities. Household saving is shown as a four-quarter moving average.

# For example Australia and the US have experienced quite contrasting 'wealth effects'

## US and Australian household net wealth




## US and Australian household saving




Sources: US Federal Reserve; Australian Bureau of Statistics; Economics@ANZ

# Australia is not the only country to have experienced these trends

**Increase in house prices  
1995 to 2002**



**Growth in household credit  
1995 to mid-2003**



Sources: *The Economist*, 31 May 2003; RBA, *Statement on Monetary Policy*, August 2003

## ***The Economist* says this represents a ‘bubble’ ...**

- ‘Neither low interest rates nor population growth can justify recent house-price booms’
  - interest rates are low (argues *The Economist*) only because inflation is low – which simply shifts the profile of payments from the earlier to the later years of a loan – real rates are not particularly low
  - supply constraints are already factored into current prices and will not stop prices falling in future – ‘just look at Hong Kong’
- ‘Price-(rental) earnings ratios’ for housing suggest that ‘house prices in ... Australia ... are at least 30% too high’
  - low nominal interest rates do not justify higher p/e ratios to the extent that they simply reflect lower inflation
- The ratio of average house prices to average incomes ‘is currently flashing red in ... Australia’
- ‘All of the countries where houses appear to be over-valued (incl. Australia) share another bubble-like symptom – an explosion in mortgage borrowing in recent years’

Source: “A survey of property”, *The Economist*, 31 May 2003, p. 6.

**... and that house prices in Australia (and other places) are likely to fall by more than 20%**

**‘Over-valuation’ and prospective house price movements  
according to *The Economist***

<b>Country</b>	<b>% over-valuation relative to 1975-2002 average</b>	<b>% price fall forecast over four years</b>
<b>Australia</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-20</b>
<b>Britain</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-25</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-20</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-30</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-30</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-10</b>

Source: “A survey of property”, *The Economist*, 31 May 2003, p. 10.



# If *The Economist* is right, then the Australian economy could be in for very tough times


According to the IMF,

- housing price booms are more likely to be followed by busts than equity price booms
  - over the post-war period, 40% of housing price booms in industrial countries ended in busts, compared with 25% of share price booms
- housing price busts involve smaller price declines than equity price busts, but last longer
  - housing price busts involved price declines averaging 30%, as against 45% for share price busts, but lasted for 4 years on average, compared with 2½ years for share price busts
- but the (adverse) effects on economic activity of a housing price bust are much greater
  - the output loss associated with a 'typical' housing bust averages about 8% of GDP, compared with 4% of GDP following a 'typical' share price bust

Source: International Monetary Fund, "When Bubbles Burst", *World Economic Outlook*, April 2003.


# Immigration and falling average household size have added to 'fundamental' housing demand

## Sources of population growth



**Net immigration has exceeded 130,000 pa over the past two years – much more than previously recognized**

## Persons per household




**Falling household size has resulted in 500,000 more households than there would otherwise have been**

Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ.

# However the supply of housing has barely kept pace with the increase in underlying demand

## Number of households and number of dwellings




Note: Dwelling stock estimates for 1991, 1996 and 2001 based on census figures; other years interpolated using completions data. Sources: RBA; ABS; Economics@ANZ.


- Over the ten years to 2001-02, the number of households rose by 1.34 million or 22%
  - faster than the increase in population (13.5%) because of falling average household size
- Over the same period, the stock of housing increased by 1.32 million or 20%
  - 1.45mn new dwellings were completed during this period, but around 130,000 old dwellings were demolished
- In effect, the increase in the supply of housing over the past decade was only just sufficient to absorb the increase in the number of households requiring accommodation

# Over 1992-2002 mortgage rates halved and real incomes rose 7 times faster than during 1982-1992

Standard variable mortgage rate




Average weekly earnings



Sources: RBA; Economics@ANZ.

# The rise in house prices over the past five years is thus 'fundamentally' justified, not a 'bubble'

## Borrowing capacity and house prices




Note: data are for the June quarter each year.

Sources: ABS; REIA; Economics@ANZ.

- Over the past 12 years average incomes have risen by 63% while the mortgage rate has fallen by about half
- The borrowing capacity of an average-income household has risen by nearly 175% as a result
- With no net increase in the stock of dwellings this increase in 'purchasing power' has been capitalized into prices
- However, this is one-time shift in the level of house prices – not a permanent increase in their rate of change

# Using the same ratios bankers use to assess individual loans, debt doesn't seem unsustainable

**Household debt as a p.c. of household assets**



**Household interest payments as a p.c. of disposable income**



Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ; RBA.

## However the shifts which have 'justified' the rise in household borrowing are coming to an end

- Historically, periods of rapidly rising house prices have been terminated by sharp increases in interest rates (or, pre-1980s, interruptions to the supply of finance) combined with abrupt increases in unemployment
  - neither of which seems likely to occur in the foreseeable future
- However the big 'structural' downward shift in interest rates is now over
  - rather than trending downwards, interest rates will fluctuate around current levels in line with the ebbs and flows of the economic cycle
- Thus the 'level shift' in property prices has also (in principle) just about run its course
- Henceforth, property prices should (in principle) be driven by
  - growth in average incomes
  - trends in housing supply relative to the number of households (nationally and at the regional level) cycle
- However there is a risk that this transition may not occur smoothly




# History suggests almost every bubble starts with a 'justified' shift in prices

- 'Bubbles' occur when what begins as a fundamentally justified increase in the price of an asset becomes widely misperceived as a permanent increase in the rate of change of that price
  - attracting speculative investment, as opposed to 'genuine' demand
  - 'bubbles' attract new participants – as both promoters and investors
  - ... and new theories to 'explain' why things have changed forever (and why some people "don't get it")
  - 'bubbles' are usually also characterized by increasing leverage
- Some of these characteristics are beginning to become more apparent in parts of the Australian property market
  - investors now account for 44% of all new lending for housing
  - investor interest has been fuelled by the halving of the capital gains tax rate in 2001 (enhancing the appeal of 'negative gearing') ...
  - ... and by a cyclical swing in sentiment away from equities
  - there has been a proliferation of 'fringe advisers' who are subject to very little supervision or regulation compared with investment advisers in other areas



# Investors have become increasingly important participants in the residential property market

## Housing loan approvals




## Investor loan approvals as a share of total housing finance




Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ.

# The growing investor presence in property markets may be a new source of volatility

## Rental vacancy rates



## Rental yields - units





Sources: REIA; Economics@ANZ.

- By definition, owner-occupiers face zero vacancy rates and rarely sell when faced with the prospect of declining house prices
- Owner-occupiers are thus an inherently stabilizing force in property markets – except during periods of rising interest rates and unemployment
- But investors may become net sellers in response to rising vacancy rates and ‘earnings disappointments’ – in the same way as investors in equities
- The enlarged presence of investors may thus have introduced a new source of volatility into property markets

# Housing activity will strengthen over the next 6 months ahead of a downturn in 2004-05


## Dwelling commencements




Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ.

# Unit prices appear to be levelling off, at least in Melbourne and Sydney


## Sydney prices




## Brisbane prices



## Melbourne prices



## Other capitals prices



Sources: REIA; Economics@ANZ.

# Some policies could help improve affordability – but other suggestions would make things worse

## Measures which should be considered

- Measures to increase land supply/speed development
  - land release programs
  - planning processes
- Reductions in taxes/charges for land development
  - will improve developer profits but may not necessarily increase land supply or reduce prices to ultimate buyers
- Reconsider tax incentives for investors
  - not true that suspension of negative gearing in mid-1980s 'caused' surge in rents
  - but probably not politically feasible


## Measures which almost certainly wouldn't work

- Anything that enables Australians to buy more expensive houses ...
- ... results in more expensive houses
- Stamp duty concessions
  - except in very weak markets, would be capitalized into prices
  - there's an equity case for cutting stamp duty and paying for it by raising land tax, but it's probably not politically feasible
- Higher first home owner grants
  - except in very weak markets, would be capitalized into prices
- 'Shared equity' schemes
  - ditto


# The Australian economy has passed its low point, and growth is now picking up strongly

## Sources of growth in the Australian economy

### Farm vs non-farm





### Domestic vs external



Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ

# Leading indicators for the global economy are now signalling a strong rebound in growth


## Leading indicators of global industrial production




*Note:* Global IP series constructed by Economics@ANZ from data for 42 countries. Global PMI is a weighted average of PMIs for the US, Euro area, UK, Canada, Australia and (from January 1999), Hong Kong and Singapore. *Sources:* Datastream, OECD, ISM, CIPS, Reuters, NTC, AiGroup, Economics@ANZ.

# Australia doesn't look like an economy in need of continued monetary stimulus


## Consumer confidence




## Retail sales




## Personal borrowing




## Business confidence



## Dwelling approvals



## Full-time employment




Sources: Westpac-Melbourne Institute; National Australia Bank; Reserve Bank of Australia; ABS.




# The Reserve Bank is 'alert but not alarmed' about the outlook for inflation

## Labour costs




## Consumer prices



Sources: ABS; Commonwealth Treasury.

# The Reserve Bank will move monetary policy settings back to 'neutral', but not 'restrictive'

## Short-term interest rates




Sources: Reuters; Economics@ANZ.

- The Reserve Bank began moving monetary policy back to 'neutral' (cash rate of 5½-6%) in mid-2002 ...
- ... but was forced to shelve that intention by the renewed global downturn and the drought
- With both of those constraints now easing, the Bank is reverting to 'Plan A' – which means a cash rate of 5½% by Q2 2004 unless another economic shock intervenes
- The Reserve Bank is not targeting house prices, nor is it trying to slow the economy down
- However it does want to avoid exacerbating the risks associated with persistent rapid growth in household debt, by returning interest rates to 'normal' levels

# While households are now more sensitive to changes in interest rates, businesses are less so

**Corporate sector debt-equity ratio**



**Corporate sector interest cover ratio**



Sources: ABS; Economics@ANZ..

# Summary

- Most of the rapid increase in residential property prices over the past few years is 'justified' by a combination of
  - greatly enhanced household borrowing capacity, and
  - strong growth in underlying housing demand relative to supply
- The 'price level shift' warranted by these factors has now largely occurred, so property prices should, in general, start to 'level out'
- However investors, acting on the mistaken belief that the rate of change in house prices has permanently increased, could push prices well above levels justified by 'fundamentals'
- Hence there is some risk that the boom of the past few years could be extended and ultimately end in a 'bust'
  - at the moment this risk is concentrated in particular market segments
- The Reserve Bank is seeking to minimize this risk by returning interest rates to 'neutral' now that the downside risks to Australian economic growth are fading
  - but the Reserve Bank is not in the business of 'bubble-pricking'
- Policy should focus on measures to improve housing supply
  - measures aimed at 'improving affordability' just lead to higher prices