# OUTLOOK FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA


PRESENTATION TO THE FACTSET INVESTMENT PROCESS SYMPOSIUM 2017

INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, SYDNEY 4<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 2017


### SAUL ESLAKE

## Economic growth across 'advanced' economies has been consistently weaker than expected – yet unemployment has fallen sharply


## OECD area real GDP growth



### OECD area unemployment rate



### 3-year change in OECD unemployment rate




Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD). The OECD comprises 34 (mostly) 'advanced' economies in North America and Europe, plus Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Chile, Turkey & Israel.




## It could be that GDP growth is being understated – or it could be that 'potential growth' has slowed


## OECD area population growth



## OECD area labour productivity growth



### OECD area potential GDP growth








## The four largest 'advanced' economies are now more or less at 'full employment'


## Four largest 'advanced' economies - unemployment

## 12 ¬% of labour force 11 Germany 10 3 Japan 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

#### Broader measures of US 'under-employment'



### **Employment-population** ratios









## Inflation looks to have passed its low point in each of the four largest 'advanced' economies


### Wage inflation – four largest 'advanced' economies



### US wage inflation – alternative measures



## 'Core' CPI inflation – four largest 'advanced' economies




Note: The Atlanta Fed wage growth tracker measures the increase in the hourly earnings of identified individuals over 12-month intervals. It excludes those with annual earnings exceeding US\$150K, and hourly earnings less than US\$2.13. 'Core' inflation figures for Japan exclude effects of GST increase in April 2014. Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Japan Labour Ministry; Statistics Japan and Bank of Japan; Statistics Bundesamt; UK Office of National Statistics: Thomson Reuters Datastream.




#### Some other 'straws in the wind' regarding inflation


#### **US ISM prices paid**



#### Philadelphia Fed prices



#### Asian producer prices









## So the long down-trend in interest rates has come to an end – as bond markets began to sense from the middle of last year


### Major central bank policy interest rates



### Major central bank balance sheets




#### 10-year bond yields






## US consumer and business confidence have improved sharply since the election


#### Consumer confidence



#### Small business optimism



#### **CEO** confidence




Sources: The Conference Board; University of Michigan Survey Research Center; National Federation of Small Businesses.




## Three reasons why Trump's fiscal policies may not have the same impact on economic growth as Reagan's


#### Interest rates



#### Federal budget and debt



#### **Labour supply**









#### A full-blown 'trade war' would send the US economy into recession

### Simulated changes in US real GDP under 'trade war' scenarios



### Simulated levels of US unemployment under 'trade war' scenario




Note: 'full trade war' scenario assumes US imposes 45% tariff on non-oil imports from China and 35% on non-oil imports from Mexico, and China & Mexico impose similar tariffs on imports from US. 'Aborted trade war' assumes US tariffs are imposed for only a single year, because China and Mexico concede to US demands, the US Congress overturns the action, or President Trump loses in the courts, or the public outcry is such that the administration is forced to stand down Source: Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson and Tyler Moran, 'Impact of Clinton's and Trump's Trade Policies, in Peterson Institute for International Economics, Briefing 16-6, 'Assessina Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaian', September 2016.




#### Increased tariffs would hurt the poorest households hardest

### Tariff burden relative to after-tax income




### Tariff burden relative to expenditures excluding mortgage, rent & utilities





## The US has imposed more trade-restricting measures than any other country since the financial crisis


#### Anti-trade measures introduced since 2008 – selected countries





## The US dollar will either rise further, or fall a lot – depending in large part on what Trump does

#### US dollar vs other major currencies



- If Trump sticks to his 'pro-growth' agenda (tax cuts together with increased spending on defence and infrastructure) then the US dollar will probably keep rising
  - in response to rising US inflation and interest rates
- ☐ If Trump pursues a highly protectionist trade policy, and/or seeks to politicize the Federal Reserve, then the US dollar will likely fall (and potentially fall a lot)
  - because those kind of actions will undermine confidence in the US financial system, and the US dollar, as a 'safe haven'

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.




### Populism has been on the march longer in Europe than the US




#### The euro area economy is gradually improving

#### **Real GDP**




#### **Employment**



#### Inflation




#### **Business & consumer confidence**



#### **Unemployment**




#### Interest rates





#### Backtracking from fiscal austerity has helped the recovery in Europe

#### Measures of the stance of fiscal policy in the euro area




Note: The 'cyclically adjusted budget balance' is the budget balance excluding interest payments and abstracting from the impact of the business cycle on government revenues and expenditures.

Source: European Central Bank, Economic Bulletin, Issue 4, 2016, p. 71.




## Last year's Brexit hit sterling and confidence, but so far the dire warnings about economic consequences have not been borne out


#### Sterling vs US\$




#### **Business confidence**




#### Retail sales volume



#### **Manufacturing production**



#### **Real GDP**




#### Unemployment






## 'Brexiteers' think that the EU 'needs' the UK more than the UK 'needs' the EU – but in fact UK-EU trade matters more to the UK than to the rest of the EU

### UK balance of trade on goods and services – EU and rest of the world



UK-EU trade as a pc of UK and EU ex-UK GDP









## China's growth has slowed a lot; it's no longer driven by net exports; and it isn't running big current account surpluses any more


#### China real GDP growth



### Contributions to Chinese real GDP growth



### Chinese current account surplus







## China <u>has</u> been 'manipulating' its currency – to stop it falling, rather than to make it cheaper

#### Chinese yuan vs US dollar

#### Net apparent capital inflow

#### **PBoC FX reserves**






Note: 'Other apparent capital inflows' = current account balance minus capital account balance, change in FX reserves and net FDI. Sources: People's Bank of China; Bank for International Settlements; China National Statistics Bureau.




## Chinese authorities have reversed the declines in the property sector and residential construction which occurred late 2015 and early 2016


#### Real estate investment




#### **Steel production**



#### Iron ore and coal production




#### **Urban property prices**



#### **Cement production**




#### Iron ore and steel prices






## China now carries a lot of debt – most of which is owed by the corporate sector (especially SOEs) rather than households or government


### China debt outstanding as a proportion of GDP




## Emerging market 'credit gaps'



### Chinese debt outstanding by major sector








## The most recent round of Chinese monetary stimulus has been financed in a way which has increased the risks in the financial system

#### Credit growth - total



#### Credit growth - by sector



#### Banking system liabilities




#### Banking system deposits-to-loans ratio






## Chinese authorities making tentative steps towards restraining credit growth, but no appetite for slower economic growth

### China short-term interest rates



#### China 10-year bond yield



- Market-sensitive interest rates have moved up since mid-November
  - it's not clear whether this reflects discretionary policy tightening by the PBoC or simply 'market pressures'
  - there has been no change to regulated deposit or loan interest rates, or to reserve requirement ratios
- ☐ The government's growth target of '6½% or higher' for 2017 isn't materially different from last year's 6½-7%
  - likewise the reduction in the money supply growth target from 13% to 12% doesn't foreshadow major credit tightening
- □ The focus is on 'stability' ahead of the 19<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress in November
  - that's likely to include stability in credit conditions and asset prices

Note: 'Shibor' = Shanghai inter-bank offered [interest] rate.
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.




## Chinese Stats Bureau doesn't just publish economic statistics, it explains why the economy is doing so well




## National Economy Registered a Steady Performance with Good Growth Momentum in the First Two Months In the first two months, under the correct guidance and arrangement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, and with concerte

In the first two months, under the correct guidance and arrangement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, and with concerte of Chinese people, main indicators of the Chinese economy registered positive changes and economic performance kept improving. The overall economy sustained steady p




#### Perhaps the Australian Bureau of Statistics should do the same ...




## The resources investment boom is over – but the rebound in commodity prices has pushed Australia's trade balance back into surplus


### Australia's resources investment & export volumes



## Australia's resources export prices



### Australia's merchandise trade balance




Note: Resources investment includes exploration expenditure. Sources: ABS; RBA.




## Will the rebound in commodity prices be a 'get out jail free' card for the Australian economy – like it was after the financial crisis?


# Australia's terms of trade (ratio of export to import prices)



# Gains in real income arising from changes in the terms of trade



#### Growth in real gross domestic income (GDI) vs real GDP




Note: 'The 'terms of trade' is the ratio of the implicit price deflator of exports of goods and services to the implicit price deflator of imports of goods and services. Real gross domestic income (GDI) is real gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for income gains or losses arising from changes in the terms of trade. Source: ABS.




## Much of the recent uptick in national income growth has gone to profits – but economic and political uncertainty are holding back investment


#### Pre-tax company profits



#### **Business investment**



### Business conditions and confidence




Note: 'Other sectors' in the company profits survey exclude banks and other deposit-taking intermediaries, insurance and super funds, education & training, and health care & social assistance. Mining investment includes buildings & structures and plant, equipment & machinery from the capex survey plus exploration expenditure; investment by 'other sectors' is the national accounts measure of total new business investment minus this estimate of mining investment.

Sources: ABS; National Australia Bank Monthly Business Survey.




## Employers are cautious about additional hiring, especially of full-time workers – and about granting wage increases


#### **Employer hiring intentions**




#### Full- vs part-time employment



#### Labour force under-utilization




#### **Employment growth**



#### **Unemployment rate**




#### Wage cost index






## Weak income growth and debt repayment continue to detract from growth in consumer spending


### Real household disposable income



#### Household saving rate



#### **Consumer spending**




Source: ABS.




## The end of the mining investment boom, combined with the falls in the A\$ and interest rates, have shifted regional pattern of economic growth


#### **Business conditions**



#### **Business investment**



#### **Unemployment rate**




Note: Business conditions are weighted by State or Territory shares of GDP. 'Business investment' is from the ABS capex survey which excludes intellectual property investment, and investment by the agriculture, forestry& fishing; public administration & safety; education & training; and health care & social assistance sectors; and by superannuation funds. Sources: National Australia Bank; ABS.




## Housing activity is probably close to peaking – although there is still a large 'pipeline' of work yet to be completed


## Private residential building approvals, by type of dwelling



### Residential buildings under construction



### Dwellings approved but not yet commenced









## Reserve Bank and APRA will be keeping an eye on the apparent rebound in lending to investors

## Finance commitments for residential property purchases



## Housing finance outstanding by type of borrower



### Lending for purchase of new housing, by type of borrower









## Reserve Bank and APRA will be keeping an eye on the apparent rebound in lending to investors


## Capital city residential property prices



## Mortgage lending to first-time buyers and investors



### Home ownership rates by age group




Note: \* 2016-17 data are for July-November 2016. Sources: CoreLogic; ABS.




## Unlikely to be any repeat of last year's inflation surprises, but it will probably be a while before the RBA starts raising rates


#### **Consumer price inflation**



## External vs domestic influences on prices



#### Interest rates









## Outlook for A\$ depends crucially on what the US\$ does – although commodity prices and interest rate spreads may also be important

#### A\$-US\$ and US\$ vs other currencies



#### A\$-US\$ vs commodity prices



#### A\$-U\$\$ vs interest rate spreads

