### THE ECONOMY AND THE BEEF INDUSTRY

PRESENTATION TO KING ISLAND 'BEEF DAY' 2020


KING ISLAND CLUB, CURRIE 23<sup>RD</sup> OCTOBER 2020



## The beef industry


# Tasmania is a small part ( $\sim$ 2½%) of the Australian beef industry, but the beef industry is an important part of Tasmania's economy

Beef production as a pc of total value of agricultural production, by state, 2018-19



☐ Beef and veal production represents 20.9% of the total value of agricultural production in Tasmania, just below the national average of 21.2%

Beef production as a pc of gross state product (value of economic activity), by state, 2018-19




Beef and veal production represents 1.0% of Tasmania's gross state product, well above the national average of 0.7%



## Tasmanian beef producers have relatively high costs – but because they produce a premium product they command higher prices ...

### Beef farm costs, average 2016-7 through 2018-19



□ Tasmanian beef farmers' operating cash costs per kilo were 9½% higher (and total costs 12¼% higher) than the national average from 2016-17 through 2018-19

#### Average price per kilo, 2016-17 through 2018-19




■ But the prices received by Tasmanian producers were 18½% higher than the national average over this period




## ... and hence generate higher returns, both in absolute terms and as a rate of return on capital invested

## Beef farmers' average profit margins, 2016-17 through 2018-19



☐ Tasmanian beef producers' margins were 25¢ per kilo (151/4%) above the national average over the three years to 2018-19

## Average rate of return (excluding capital appreciation), 2016-17 through 2018-19




☐ Tasmanian beef producers' returns averaged 2.8% pa over the three years to 2018-19, double the national average (less than the NT because of higher land values)



### Tasmanian beef producers have been consistently more profitable than the national average over the last 20, and especially the last 5, years


## Average beef farm profit, Tasmania and Australia, 1999-2000 through 2018-19



Financial years ended 30th June

Over the past twenty years, Tasmanian beef farmers' profits have averaged more than twice as much as beef farmers across Australia as a whole

## Percentage of Tasmanian beef farmers in national top and bottom rate of return quartiles (25%)




Financial years ended 30th June

On average over the past twenty years, 35% of Tasmanian beef farmers have been in the top quartile of national rates of return, and only 19% in the bottom quartile



## The King Island beef model is a little different – or at least it was in 2009-10 when this data was collected




Note: Data shown in these charts is for the 2009-10 financial year. 'DSE' = dry sheep equivalent (the amount of feed required for a 2-year old, 50 kilo merino sheep to maintain its weight; one yearling steer is equivalent to about 8 DSE. 'Other' is average for Southern Australian MLA region (including mainland Tasmania, Victoria, NSW, SA and southern Queensland. Source: Holmes Sackett (via Roger Clemons).




# Tasmania's beef industry is less dependent on exports – and its exports are much less dependent on China than mainland beef exporters


## Exports as a pc of total beef production



Markets for Tasmanian beef exports, 2019-20



Markets for Australian beef exports, 2019-20




Financial years ended 30th June



## The virus


# Over the past week there've been more than 2½mn new cases, taking the total to over 40mn – although the fatality rate is declining





# 32% of new cases are now in Europe, 16% in the US and 6% in Russia, Iran & Indonesia: another 16% are in India & 6% in Brazil, but they're now falling


### Daily new cases – selected countries with large populations and/or rapid growth in cases




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### Australia's 'second wave' of infections is now over

### Cases, recoveries, hospitalizations and deaths




#### New cases




Note: Data up to 21st October. Source: covid19data.com.au.



# Victoria's new cases have declined to an average of just below 10 a day, while NSW's have risen to just above that, and WA's have also crept higher




### Cases per 100,000 population



Note: Data up to 21st October. Source: covid19data.com.au.



# Australia's infection and death rates remain, along with NZ's and most East Asian countries', low by international standards




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## The world


# Of the 91 economies which have reported Q2 GDP data so far, 9 have reported contractions of more than 20% and only 3 have reported growth

### Real GDP growth over the year to Q2 2020



# The world economy experienced has contracted by about 9%, and the OECD area economy by 11%%, over the year to Q2


### World and OECD area real GDP growth



Note: Estimates of global GDP growth compiled by Corinna using data for 100 countries accounting for 94% of 2019 world GDP as measured by the IMF, weighted in accordance with each country's share of global GDP at purchasing power parities in 2019.; excludes constituents of the former USSR before 1993, the former Czechoslovakia before 1995, and the former Yugoslavia before 1998. (p) Estimate for Q2 is a preliminary estimate based on published results for the 91 countries shown in the previous slide. Sources: national statistical agencies and central banks; Eurostat; OECD; IMF; Corinna. Return to "What's New".



# Every government is doing more by way of fiscal stimulus than during the financial crisis – and the US, Canada and the UK are doing more than most




Note: China debt is gross debt, not net; Australian data are for the federal government only and are for fiscal years ended 30<sup>th</sup> June; NZ data are for fiscal years ended 31<sup>st</sup> March. Sources: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor, and World Economic Outlook, October 2020; Australian Government, 2020-21 Budget Paper No. 1, October 2020; New Zealand Treasury, Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update, September 2020. Return to "What's New"




# Major central banks have cut interest rates to record lows, and done more 'quantitative easing' than during the global financial crisis

### Major central bank policy interest rates



### Major central bank balance sheets




Note: estimates of central bank assets as a pc of GDP for weeks or months since the beginning of April have been inflated by the sharp falls in nominal GDP recorded in Q2 (especially for the UK, on which see <u>slide 57</u>): Q2 nominal GDP will be used as the denominator for these estimates until Q3 data are available, beginning in November. Sources: <u>US Federal Reserve</u>; <u>European Central Bank</u>; <u>Bank of Japan</u>; <u>Bank of England</u>; <u>Bank of Canada</u>; national statistical agencies; Corinna.



## Australia's Reserve Bank has done less government bond-buying than most of its sister central banks

Central bank purchases of national government marketable securities or debt, as a percentage of total gross issuance, since end-February 2020




Sources: IMF, <u>Fiscal Monitor</u>, October 2020; and for Australia and New Zealand, calculations by Corinna using data sourced from <u>Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM)</u>, <u>Reserve Bank of Australia</u>, <u>New Zealand Treasury</u> and <u>Reserve Bank of New Zealand</u> (excludes purchases and issuance of Treasury notes).



## Australia

## Australia's record-breaking run of almost 30 years without a recession has come to an end


### Quarterly growth in Australian real GDP, 1960-2020






# The Government expects a 'growth surge' over summer followed by more modest growth in 2021-22

### Real GDP growth



☐ Treasury expects that economic growth resumed in the September quarter, will reach almost 3% in the December quarter, 2½% in the March quarter 2021 and then average ¾% per quarter for the next 5 quarters

### Unemployment




☐ Treasury expects the unemployment rate to peak at 8% in the December quarter, and then fall to 6½% by the June quarter 2022



## The Australian Government's policy measures have been large by historical and international standards

## Fiscal policy responses to Covid-19 – selected 'advanced' & Asia-Pacific economies



Note: 'Above the line' measures comprise additional or accelerated spending and deferred or foregone revenue. 'Below the line' measures comprise equity injections, loans, asset purchases and debt assumptions, but do not include loan guarantees or other contingent liabilities. 'DMs' means 'developed markets' (or 'advanced economies'). Data includes measures announced up until 20<sup>th</sup> September 2020.

Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2020.

□ Policy measures announced prior to this month's federal Budget totalled A\$232bn over FYs 2019-20 and 2020-21 or about 11¾% of one year's GDP – which is large by international standards (and double what was done during the GFC)

### ☐ Principal objectives of policy measures have been to —

- maximize the 'survival prospects' of businesses affected by shutdowns, across Australia during the first (national) shutdown and more recently in Victoria
- minimize the impact of the shutdown on employment
- provide additional income support to those who lose their jobs
- strengthen the capacity of the health care system to cope with increased demand
- □ Policy measures have been designed to be 'simple' to administer, and to make greatest use of existing systems rather than having to create new mechanisms
  - which (inevitably) resulted in some anomalies that took time to correct
- □ Policy measures also designed to be readily 'switched off' once the need for them has passed \_\_\_\_\_\_

# The FY 2020-21 Budget, unveiled this month, confirms a dramatic deterioration in the Government's fiscal position


### 2019-20 Mid-Year Economic & Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO) and 2020-21 Budget forward estimates compared

### 'Underlying' cash balance 50 \$bn -50 -100 2020-21 Budget -150 2019-20 MYEFO -200 -250 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

☐ Last December, the Government was confidently predicting a return to budget surpluses – now, it is forecasting deficits totalling \$566bn over the five years to 2023-24

Fiscal years ended 30 June

#### **Net debt**




□ Last December, net debt was expected to have peaked at \$392bn in June 2020, and fall to \$310bn by June 2024 – instead it rose to \$490bn at June 2020, and is now expected to reach \$966bn by June 2024



# The deterioration in the budget 'bottom line' is roughly equally attributable to 'policy decisions' and changes in the economic outlook

Sources of the changes in forward estimates of the budget's 'underlying cash balance' between the 2019-20 MYEFO and the 2020-21 Budget




- ☐ In December last year the Government was anticipating budget surpluses totalling \$38.4bn over the five years to 2023-24: now it is forecasting deficits totalling \$566bn a 'turnaround' of \$605bn
- ☐ Of that \$605bn 'turnaround',
  - \$292bn (just under half) is attributable to 'policy decisions', that is, conscious decisions to spend money or reduce taxes
  - and \$313bn (just under half) is attributable to what the Budget Papers call 'parameter variations', that is, changes in economic forecasts or other assumptions on which forward estimates of receipts and payments depend
- □ \$232bn (or 80%) of the 'policy decisions' were taken before the 2020-21 Budget (most of them in the first three months of the pandemic
- □ 'Policy decisions in the 2020-21 Budget amount to 'only' \$62bn
- ⇒ \$160bn (55%) of the total 'policy decisions' affect the 2020-21 financial year

Source: Australian Government, 2020-21 <u>Budget Paper No. 1, Statement No. 3</u> and <u>Budget Paper No. 2, Budget Measures</u>; Corinna.




### It's by no means certain that businesses and households will respond to the budget incentives in the way that the budget assumes

### Factors affecting business investment decisions, August 2020




### Household saving rate






# There's no need for undue alarm at the level of debt which will be incurred by the Australian Government

### Australian Government gross public debt in \$



☐ The Government's gross debt will top \$1 trillion during the 2021-22 financial year, and reach almost \$1¾ trillion by the end of the decade

### Australian Government gross debt as a pc of GDP




☐ However as a percentage of GDP, the Government's gross debt will still be less than it was in any of the first sixty years of Australia's existence as an independent nation




# Because interest rates are so low, the cost of servicing the debt which the Government is racking up will be low by historical standards

## Australian Government interest payments as a percentage of GDP



As a percentage of GDP, the Government's gross interest payments will be less than they were in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and less than they were in 2017-18 or 2018-19

## Australian Government net interest payments per head of population in 2019-20 dollars



■ Net interest payments per head of population will be less than they were in the second half of the 1980s, between 1993-94 and 1999-2000, or between 2015-16 and 2019-20



# The Reserve Bank has cut interest rates to a record low (and will probably cut them again next month): and it's doing other things too

rate


Dec-20

## Interest rates 2.50 ¬ % pa 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 3-year bond yield


Dec-19

Mar-20

### Reserve Bank assets as a pc of GDP



**RBA Term Funding Facility** 





Sep-19

0.00

Dec-18

Mar-19


Jun-19

# The A\$ has largely mirrored movements in the US\$ against other currencies, but the iron ore price and investor 'risk appetite' have also played a role




## Tasmania


# The monthly ABS labour force survey suggests that employment in Tasmania has recovered strongly from the initial sharp falls



#### **Total hours worked**



### Labour force participation rate







5 *F* 


Unemployment rates in

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
Source: ABS, <u>Labour Force</u>, <u>Australia</u>.

# The ABS' weekly payroll jobs series suggests that employment hasn't recovered as rapidly in Tasmania as in other states (except Victoria)

### Indexes of number of payroll jobs




### Change in payroll employment since 14th March






## Employment in agriculture appears to have fallen much more in Tasmania since mid-March than across Australia as a whole

### Net change in payroll jobs since 14<sup>th</sup> March - Tasmania



## Net change in payroll jobs since 14<sup>th</sup> March - Australia








# The Tasmanian Government has been relatively more generous than other states and territories in supporting households and businesses

## State & territory Covid-19 support and response measures as a pc of gross state product




## Selected Tasmanian Government economic and social support measures

- Rent relief for 11,500 social housing tenants (cost ~ \$7mn)
- Ban on private rent increases until 30<sup>th</sup> June and 90-day moratorium on evictions
- □ \$513K for additional services to youth at risk of homelessness
- □ Payments totalling \$221K to 652 temporary visa holders
- School levy relief to 11,300 eligible parents (cost \$9mn)
- An additional \$2.2mn for programs supporting victims of family and domestic violence
- ☐ Waiver of 3 months' electricity water bills for around 34,000 small businesses (cost ~ \$50mn)
- Payroll tax relief for small businesses and employers in the hospitality, tourism and seafood industries (cost \$11½mn to date)
- Land tax waiver or deferral for commercial property owners impacted by restrictions or experiencing financial hardship
- Grants and interest free loans to small businesses
- Loans to Councils for infrastructure projects and rate relief (over \$110mn in loans applied for)
- ☐ Taxi licence fees waived for 2020-21 (cost \$240K)
- ☐ Subsidized training for 150 Tasmanians who have lost jobs



# Tasmania's economy was doing well, by most measures, heading into this downturn – but that doesn't guarantee a more rapid recovery




Note: 'State final demand' is the sum of spending by households, businesses and governments Sources: ABS; NAB; FCAI; CoreLogic.



# Tasmania has historically always fared worse than the mainland during recessions, regardless of how we were doing beforehand

### Employment and unemployment in Tasmania vs the mainland during recessions



Note: Shaded areas denote quarters of negative growth in real GDP. The number of years or months (in pink) are the time differences between when mainland employment regained its pre-recession peak level, and the same milestone being achieved in Tasmania. Data are expressed in trend terms. Source: ABS; Corinna.


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# The improvement in Tasmania's economic performance in recent years owed a lot to the pick-up in migration – will that resume, and when?

### Population growth, Tasmania and Australia



### Sources of Tasmania's population growth





# Federal Treasury thinks interstate migration to Tasmania will bounce back reasonably quickly, but only for two years

Federal Treasury Budget forecasts for net overseas and interstate migration

Table A.5: Net overseas migration, for years ending 30 June

	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24
Net overseas migration, Australia	239,700	154,100	-71,600	-21,600	95,900	201,100


Table A.6: Net interstate migration by state, for years ending 30 June

	NSW	VIC	QLD	WA	SA	TAS	ACT	NT
2018-19	-22,100	12,200	22,800	-6,500	-4,000	2,000	-200	-4,400
2019-20	-21,000	11,600	21,700	-6,100	-3,800	1,900	-200	-4,200
2020-21	-14,300	-1,200	22,000	-3,700	-2,200	2,200	300	-3,100
2021-22	-15,500	-1,300	23,800	-4,000	-2,300	2,300	400	-3,300
2022-23	-17,000	1,800	21,300	-2,300	-3,000	1,200	300	-2,400
2023-24	-18,600	5,000	18,900	-500	-3,600	0	200	-1,400




# China takes almost 30% of Tasmania's exports, although that still represents less than 5% of Tasmania's gross product


## Tasmania's goods exports to China



## Goods exports to China as a pc of exports of goods




## Goods exports to China as a pc of gross state product






# Tourism is a big part of Tasmania's economy, and had slowed over the past two years – have we become 'too dependent' on tourism?


### **Visitors to Tasmania**



### Tourism gross value added



### **Tourism employment**





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