WEALTH INEQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA – AN INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

PRESENTATION TO THE SALAVATION ARMY RED SHIELD APPEAL BUSINESS BREAKFAST

HOTEL GRAND CHANCELLOR, HOBART

16TH MAY 2025



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In Australia as elsewhere, wealth is distributed more unequally than income – largely because while income is progressively taxed, wealth isn't

Gini coefficients for distribution of household

Distribution of household disposable income and wealth by quintile, Australia, 2019-20 disposable income and wealth, 2003-04 to 2019-20 0.37 70 % of total 0.63 60 0.36 0.62 50 0.35 0.61 Wealth right scale) 40 0.34 0.60 30 0.33 0.59 20 0.32 0.58 Disposable income (left scale) 10 0.31 0.57 \cap 0.30 0.56 Third Lowest Second Fourth Highest 2003 2005 2013 2015 2017 2019 2009 2011 -04 -06 -10-12-14-16 -18 -20 Income / net worth auintile Financial years ended 30th June Income Wealth

Note: Household disposable income is 'equivalized' to take account of differences in the size and composition of households. The Gini coefficient is an internationally accepted summary measure of inequality ranging in value from zero representing 'perfect' equality to 1 representing complete inequality. Source: ABS, Household Income and Wealth, Australia, 2019-20 and previous issues. The survey which would ordinarily have been conducted in 2021-22 was cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic.


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
Australia is 'middling' in terms of the degree of inequality in wealth distribution compared with other countries

Share of household wealth held by the top 10%, Australia and other selected countries, 2022




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Share of household wealth held by the top 1%, Australia and other selected countries, 2022





The distribution of Australian household wealth has become slightly more unequal since the turn of the century



Shares of total Australian household wealth owned by net worth quintiles




4 Source: ABS, <u>Household Income and Wealth, Australia</u>, 2019-20 and previous issues.

Increasing inequality in the distribution of wealth is much starker when viewed through an inter-generational lens

Distribution of household net worth by age group % of total 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 $\mathbf{0}$ 15-34 35-44 44-54 54-64 65+ $(\downarrow 1.7 \text{ pc pts})$ $(\downarrow 5.9 \text{ pc pts})$ $(\downarrow 4.6 \text{ pc pts})$ $(\uparrow 2.7 \text{ pc pts})$ $(\uparrow 10.8 \text{ pc pts})$ Age group ■ 03-04 ■ 05-06 ■ 09-10 ■ 11-12 ■ 13-14 ■ 15-16 ■ 17-18 ■ 19-20

65 and over share of number of households and of total household net worth





Financial years ended 30th June




Older Australians disproportionately own financial assets and owneroccupied property – while younger Australians have most of the liabilities

Shares of total household financial assets by age group





Share of total household nonfinancial assets by age group




Owner-occupied property

Other property

Other assets


Share of total household liabilities by age group





Assets more commonly owned by older households have accounted for a rising share of total Australian household wealth






Real estate and superannuation assets make up a large share of Australian household wealth than in any other comparable country

Composition of household assets, Australia and other similar countries

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


Note: Australian, Canadian and US data are as at end-June 2024; New Zealand as at end-March 2024; and UK as at end-December 2023. Sources: ABS, <u>Australian System of</u> <u>National Accounts</u>, 2023-24; Statistics NZ, <u>National accounts (income, saving, assets and liabilities)</u>, June quarter 2024; Statistics Canada, <u>National balance sheet and financial</u> <u>flow accounts</u>, second quarter 2024; UK ONS, <u>The UK national balance sheet time series</u>, 2023; US Federal Reserve, <u>Financial Accounts of the United States</u>, 2024;Q2 release.

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Home ownership rates among Australians aged under 45 are back to where they were in the late 1940s and 1950s



Sources: Advisory Council on Inter-Government Relations, Australian Housing Policy and Inter-government Relations, Discussion Paper No. 14 (1981); ABS, <u>Housing: Census</u>, 2021 and previous issues; Judy Yates, <u>Submission to the Senate Economic References Committee on Affordable Housing</u>, 2015; Rachel Clun, 'Mortgages in retirement triple, outright ownership halves for most age groups' <u>The Age</u>, 17th July 2022.

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
Younger households have borne the brunt of the 'cost of living crisis' while older households have been very little affected

Per capita spending on 'discretionary' items by

age cohort, year ended September quarter 2024

Per capita spending on 'essential' items by age cohort, year ended September quarter 2024


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
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Australia's income tax system has become increasingly generous towards older Australians


Average tax rate by age group



Over 65s as share of number of households, gross income, wealth and tax paid



Australia's income tax system taxes income from most forms of wealth more lightly than income from wages and salaries (or interest)



Sources of taxable income – top rate and other taxpayers, 2021-22


12 Source: Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics - Table 4: Selected items, by sex, taxable status, state/territory and taxable income range, 2021-22 income year.

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
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82% of inheritances by value go to people aged 50 or over – and most go to people who are already in the upper half of the wealth distribution

Average age of recipients of inheritances – Victoria, 2016



Recipients of inheritances by net wealth quintile -Victoria, 2016




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Note: Data derived from analysis of probate data for 'final estates' (ie those without a surviving spouse) from Victoria for 2016, Source: Danielle Wood and Kate Griffiths, Generation Gap: Ensuring a fair go for younger Australians, Grattan Institute, August 2019. 13

25 out of 38 OECD countries – including (significantly) the US and the UK – retain some form of inheritance tax – Australia is an 'outlier'





What could be done to slow or reverse this rising tide of intergenerational inequality in the distribution of wealth?

□ Stop doing things that make housing less affordable ...

 first home-owner grants, stamp duty concessions, mortgage deposit guarantee schemes, untargeted shared equity schemes, generous tax breaks for property investors

... and start doing (or do more of) things that would make housing more affordable

 reform planning & zoning laws and regulations, reduce taxes & charges on new builds, address the factors preventing the construction of affordable apartments for families

□ Reduce the concessionality of the tax treatment of superannuation

- replace the 15% flat tax on contributions and earnings with a 15% rebate from the otherwise applicable marginal tax rate
- reduce the tax-free threshold for payments out of superannuation funds


Reduce the concessionality of the tax treatment of income from investments relative to wage & salary income

- revert to the 1985-1999 model of taxing capital gains at the full marginal rate less an allowance for the impact of CPI inflation (or at the very least reduce the capital gains tax discount from 50% to 33% or 25%)
- restrict 'negative gearing' to investment in newly-built rental properties
- 'look through' trusts for tax purposes
- Replace stamp duties on land transfers with a broadly-based land tax (with no exemptions for owner-occupied properties)
 - and if states won't do it, re-introduce a federal land tax (as existed between 1910 and 1954) and give the revenue to the states and territories on the condition that they abolish stamp duties on land transfers

□ Re-introduce inheritance taxes

 but ensure that the thresholds are indexed so that inflation doesn't drag relatively small estates into the tax net (as it did in the 1960s and 1970s)


Tasmania's state public sector finances are in worse shape than those of any other state or territory



Total non-financial public sector cash deficit

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
Total non-financial public sector net financial liabilities



Note: The 'non-financial public sector' includes government business enterprises (such as Hydro Tasmania and TasNetworks, but not public financial corporations such as the MAIB. 'Net financial liabilities' include unfunded superannuation liabilities. Note the ACT's superannuation liabilities aren't as large as they appear in government finance statistics, because its employee superannuation arrangements are managed via the Commonwealth Government's superannuation fund, which precludes the ACT from including capital gains on its superannuation investments in its GFS financial statements, as the states and the Northern Territory do. Sources: State and territory government annual financial reports and 2024-25 mid-year budget reviews/updates; Corinna.


Every year the Grants Commission assesses how much each state needs to spend, and can raise in taxes, by being 'average'

Grants Commission assessment of states' & territories' expenditure needs



The Grants Commission assesses how much each state & territory needs to spend (per head) in order to provide the same standard of services as the average of all states & territories, taking account of difference in need for services and costs of providing them

Grants Commission assessment of states' and territories' revenue-raising capacity and needs




The Grants Commission assesses how much revenue each state & territory would raise (per head) if its taxes were the same as the average of all states & territories, and then determines how much GST revenue (per head) it would need to 'equalize' them

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
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2024 Update - Assessed budget, April 2024.

The Grants Commission reckons that Tasmania has been spending less than it 'needs to', and raising less revenue than it 'could', by being 'average'



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Average 'revenue-raising effort' ratios, 2019-20 to 2022-23



Note: The 'level of service provision' ratio is the ratio of total actual operating expenses by each state and territory to the Grants Commission's assessment of what it would need to spend in order to deliver the same level of services with the same 'efficiency' as the average of all states and territories. Similarly, the 'revenue-raising effort' ratio is the ratio of total taxation revenue actually raised by each state and territory to the Grants Commission's assessment of what it could raise if its tax regime were the same as the average of all states and territories. Note that the ACT Government also has local government expenditure responsibilities and revenue-raising powers. Sources: Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2024 Update of GST relativities, April 2024; Independent Review of Tasmania's State Finances, August 2024.

Important information

This document has been prepared by Saul Eslake on behalf of Corinna Economic Advisory Pty Ltd, ABN 165 668 058 69, whose registered office is located at Level 11, 114 William Street, Melbourne, Victoria 3000 Australia.

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