ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

13TH NOVEMBER 2021

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What's new?

The world

- ❑ 3.32mn new infections were reported around the world this week, the fourth increase in a row (slide 4) – with almost all of the increases in the past two weeks being in Europe (slide 5)
- ❑ China registered a record merchandise trade surplus of US$85bn in October, due to ongoing strength in its exports – about the only area of the Chinese economy which isn't slowing (slide 47)
- ❑ China recorded its highest-ever annual increase in producer prices in October, and consumer price inflation, though still low, appears to be picking up as well (slide 49)
- ❑ US consumer prices rose a stronger-than-expected 0.9% in October, pushing the annual 'headline' inflation rate up to a 31-year high of 6.2%, while the 'core' (ex-food and energy) index rose 0.6% in October and 4.6% from a year earlier, a 30-year high: the acceleration in inflation appears to be becoming more broadly-based (slides 71-72), although longer-term inflation expectations remain 'well-anchored'
- ❑ US consumer sentiment slumped in early November to its lowest level in 10 years, in response to the pick-up in inflation (slide 66)
- ❑ The pace of wage increases in the US has picked up surprisingly strongly this year (slide 76) even though most measures suggest there's still considerable 'slack' in the labour market (slide 70) – the so-called 'Great Resignation' may imply that the 'NAIRU' is higher than previously thought (slide 76)
- ❑ The UK economy grew by a less-than-expected 1.3% in Q3, due to slower household spending and a fall in exports (slide 82)
- ❑ Emerging market central banks continue to raise rates – this week in Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Romania (slides 85-86)

Australia and New Zealand

- ❑ Australia recorded just under 10,000 new cases this week for the second week in a row, down from the peak of 16,000 in mid-October (slide 14)
- ❑ Victoria's case numbers and hospitalizations have begun to fall but remain noticeably higher than NSW's despite a similarly high proportion of its population having been double-vaccinated (slide 15)
- ❑ Business confidence rose strongly again in October, particularly in NSW and Victoria, to be less than 3 pts below its pre-lockdown peak in April (slide 96) even though business conditions are yet to improve (slide 97)
- ❑ Employment fell another 46K (0.4%) in October, largely driven by job losses in Victoria (where restrictions didn't start to ease until after the October survey was completed) – which together with 57K people returning to the workforce in NSW pushed the official unemployment rate up 0.6 pc pts to 5.2% (slides 98-99)
- ❑ The 'effective' unemployment rate (which adds people counted as employed despite working zero hours, and people who have 'dropped out' of the workforce as a result of lockdowns, to the 'official' tally) remained unchanged at 10.3% in October (slide 100) – but should fall sharply in November and December given the high levels of job vacancies (slide 108)
- ❑ There's no evidence of any US-style 'Great Resignation' happening in Australia (slide 109), nor any evidence of a pick-up in wages growth (slide 136) – though this week's Q3 wages data will be closely watched
- ❑ Iron ore and thermal coal prices fell sharply this week (slide 123), helping to push the A$ back under US74¢ (slide 132)
- ❑ Consumer and business confidence in New Zealand have slumped in the wake of the jump in inflation, the hike in interest rates (with the prospect of more to come) and protracted restrictions (slide 151)

The virus

New Covid-19 case numbers have been rising for the past four weeks, although the official death toll has been relatively steady

Cumulative confirmed cases – global total



New confirmed cases – global total



New deaths – global total



Note: All charts are on logarithmic scales. Data up to 11th November. *Source:* University of Oxford, [Our World in Data](). [Return to "What's New"]().

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The increase in case numbers over the past two weeks has been almost entirely attributable to Europe, and to a much lesser extent South America

Daily new cases per million population – major countries and regions



- ❑ **Europe accounted for 43% of the world's new cases this week, the US 15½%, the Middle East 8¾%, Russia 8¼%, SE Asia 5¾% and Sth America 4¼% - Europe also accounted for 24½% of total deaths, Russia 16½% and the US 15½%**

Note: All charts are on logarithmic scales. Data up to 11h November. *Source:* University of Oxford, Our World in Data; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

The highest cumulative infection and death rates (since the onset of the pandemic) have been in Europe, South and North America

Apparent infection rate



Apparent fatality rate



Death rate



Note: Data up to 11th November. *Sources*: University of Oxford, Our World in Data; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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Restrictions have been easing in most parts of the world except China, NZ and Canada, though there has been some tightening in parts of Europe

Timing and severity of government restrictions on movement and gathering of people





The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker collects publicly available information on 11 indicators of government response including school & workplace closures, public events cancellations, restrictions on public gatherings, stay at home requirements, public transport closures, domestic & international travel restrictions, public information campaigns, testing and contact tracing. *Source:* Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University. Series for South-East Asia, the EU, South America and the Middle East are population-weighted averages for individual constituent countries. Data up to 11th November. Return to "What's New".

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19 countries have now fully vaccinated more than 70% of their population, another 8 are close to that threshold, and 21 more are over 50%

Percentage of population who have had at least one vaccination shot as at 9th-11th November



Note: Data for Madagascar are as at 20th October; Philippines, 21st October; Kiribati and PNG, 25th October; Laos, 28th October; Armenia, 31st October; Tonga, 1st November; Egypt, Myanmar & Peru, 6th November; Romania, 7th November; and Colombia, Cyprus, Fiji, Portugal, Solomon Islands & Vanuatu, 8th November. *Source:* Our World in Data, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations. Return to "What's New".

Progress of vaccinations has slowed in Canada, the US, UK and Europe in the past 2 months but has picked up in Japan, Australia and New Zealand

Percentage of major 'advanced' economies' populations who have had one shot



Percentage of major 'advanced' economies' populations who have had two shots



Note: Data up to 11th November, except for UK, 9th and US 10th November. It's not clear from the data source why reported NZ vaccination rates were adjusted downwards on 20th October. *Source:* Our World in Data; Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations. Return to "What's New".

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Vaccine hesitancy is now higher in the US and (surprisingly) in Germany than in other 'advanced' economies – and has fallen sharply in Australia

Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy, selected 'advanced' economies, October 2021



Percentage of populations unvaccinated and unwilling or uncertain about getting vaccinated



Note: Data for Singapore and Norway are for August; data for Korea and Sweden are for September.
Source: Imperial College London and YouGov, Covid 19 Behaviour Tracker Data Hub. Return to "What's New".

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In the US there's a strong correlation between voting patterns and vaccine hesitancy, and between vaccination rates and infection rates

Vaccination rates vs Trump vote at 2020 elections, by state



Vaccination rates vs infection rates since 30th June, by state

Note: Data as at 28th October. *Sources:* The Cook Political Report; Our World in Data; USA Facts; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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Although vaccination appears not to prevent the ‘delta variant’ from spreading, it does appear to reduce hospitalization and death rates

Hospitalization rates



Fatality rates



- **Israel, the UK and the US all experienced a surge in the number of ‘delta variant’ cases after ‘opening up’**
- **In the US, the increase in cases is concentrated in states and counties where vaccination rates are well below the national average (see previous slide)**
- **In Israel, the UK and those US states with above-average vaccination rates, hospitalization and death rates from Covid-19 as the delta variant has spread have been much lower than they were in 2020**

Note: Data up to 10th November. *Source:* Our World in Data. Return to "What's New“.

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Voter approval of governments' handling of Covid has improved in most countries over the past month, except Singapore, the UK and the US

Voter approval of their government's handling of the coronavirus pandemic



Source: YouGov, Covid-19 tracker: government handling. Return to "What's New".

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Australia recorded just over 9,600 new cases this week, the same as last week, down from 11½-16,000 new cases a week in September and October

Cases, recoveries, hospitalizations and deaths



New cases, by source



Note: Data up to 12th November. The sharp decline in 'active cases' on 10th September is entirely attributable to a 13,949 drop in the number of active cases reported in NSW (the reasons for which are not clear). *Source:* covid19data.com.au. Return to "What's New".

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New cases and hospitalizations are falling in both NSW and (more slowly) Victoria – while Western Australia will remain 'closed' until early next year

New cases



Hospitalizations



- **The number of new cases in NSW has fallen to well under 300 a day during November, and hospitalizations are down almost 80% from their peak, despite the easing of restrictions since late October – no doubted aided by almost 90% of people aged 12 & over now being fully vaccinated (slide 18)**
- **Victoria is still recorded over 1,100 new cases a day (down from a peak of over 1,900 in mid-October), and hospitalizations though down 33% from their peak are still almost double NSW's, despite 86% of people aged 12 & over now being fully vaccinated**
- **The Western Australian Government this week announced that its borders would remain closed until 90% of its population aged 12& over had been fully vaccinated (cf. 66.5% this week, the lowest in Australia) – a target which it doesn't expect to be attained until late January or early February**

Note: Data up to 12th November. *Source:* covid19data.com.au. Return to "What's New".

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The smaller states and territories have done better at keeping the virus at bay, partly because they receive fewer overseas arrivals

Days since last new locally-acquired case



Days since the last interstate-acquired case



Days since last new overseas-acquired case



Note: Data are for 12th November. *Source:* covid19data.com.au. Return to "What's New".

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People in their 20s & 30s have been more likely to become infected than other age groups this year – partly because fewer have been vaccinated

Cumulative confirmed cases per 100,000 population, by age group – 2020



Cumulative confirmed cases per 100,000 population, by age group – 2021 to date



Note: Data for 2021 up to 12th November. *Source:* Australian Government Department of Health; ABS; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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After surging in NSW, Victoria & the ACT during the recent lockdowns, vaccinations have begun to slow – with the 'outlying states' now well behind

Daily number of vaccines administered



Percentage of total population vaccinated, states and territories



Percentage of populations double-vaccinated, states and territories



Note: Data up to 12th November. The Federal and State Governments usually cite vaccination rates as percentages of the 'eligible' population – which currently excludes children under the age of 16; the third chart on this page shows vaccination rates as percentages of the total population including children. See also comparisons with other nations on slides 8 and 9. *Sources:* covid19data.com.au; Australian Department of Health, Australia's COVID-19 vaccine rollout. Return to "What's New".

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12-15 year-olds have been very quick to get vaccinated once they became eligible, and rates among younger adults have also picked up smartly

Vaccination rates by age group as at 12th November



Note: For data on infections by age group see slide 17.
Source: Commonwealth Department of Health, *Covid-19 Vaccine Roll-out update*, 29th October 2021. Return to "What's New".

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Australia's health restrictions are still stricter on average than other 'advanced' economies, but the gap is narrowing

Number of days for which the stringency of restrictions has been above 70 on the Oxford Index



Stringency of Australia's restrictions compared with an average of other 'advanced' economies



The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker collects publicly available information on 11 indicators of government response including school and workplace closures, public events cancellations, restrictions on public gatherings, stay at home requirements, public transport closures, domestic and international travel restrictions, public information campaigns, testing and contact tracing. *Source:* Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University. Data up to 10th November. Return to "What's New".

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Mobility indicators are showing how Australia is returning to 'normal' compared with other countries who haven't been under lockdown recently

Apple mobility indicators



Google non-residential activity mobility indicators



Note: 'Apple mobility indicator' is the average of three separate indicators for driving, use of transit and walking (data up to 10th November). Google 'non-residential activities' indicator is the average of separate indicators for workplaces, retail and recreation, groceries and pharmaceuticals, transit and parks (data up to 8th November).
Sources: Apple, Mobility Trends Reports; Google, Covid-19 Community Mobility Reports; Corinna Economic Advisory. Return to "What's New".

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The world

Of 87 countries which have now reported Q2 GDP estimates, 54 have recorded double-digit growth from last year's pandemic-induced trough

Growth in real GDP over the year to Q2 2021



Source: National statistical agencies and central banks. Return to "What's New".

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The world economy likely grew by about 12% over the year to Q2 – a figure which is vastly flattered by comparison with last year's trough

World and OECD area real GDP growth



Note: Estimates of global GDP growth compiled by Corinna using data for 100 countries accounting for 94% of 2019 world GDP as measured by the IMF, weighted in accordance with each country's share of global GDP at purchasing power parities in 2019; excludes constituents of the former USSR before 1993, the former Czechoslovakia before 1995, and the former Yugoslavia before 1998. (e) Estimate for Q2 2021 is based on published results the countries shown in the previous slide.
Sources: national statistical agencies and central banks; Eurostat; OECD; IMF; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

Only 18 countries (out of 52 for which seasonally-adjusted Q2 GDP estimates are available) have exceeded their pre-pandemic peaks

Q3 2021 real GDP compared with pre-recession peak



Q2 2021 real GDP compared with pre-recession peak



Note: Estimate for China derived from quarterly growth rates published by China NBS; estimate for India seasonally adjusted by Corinna using Refintiv Datastream.
Source: National statistical agencies and central banks. Return to "What's New".

The more 'advanced' Asian economies, Australia's & NZ's and the US's, have recovered more rapidly from last year's recessions than Europe's

Levels of real GDP indexed to Q4 2019 = 100



Note: All series shown are seasonally adjusted, except for China's which has been constructed using the estimates of quarterly changes in real GDP published by the China National Bureau of Statistics. *Sources:* National statistical agencies, Eurostat and Bank of Korea; Corinna.

The IMF last month marginally lowered its global growth forecast for 2021, but with larger (mostly offsetting) revisions for individual economies

Major global institutions' growth forecasts for 2020, 2021 and 2022 compared

	Actual		*IMF*		*World Bank*		*OECD*		*Australian Treasury*	
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022	2021	2022
US	2.2	-3.5	6.0	5.2	6.8	4.2	6.0	3.9	6.5	3.5
China	5.8	2.3	8.0	5.6	7.7	5.3	8.5	5.8	8.5	5.5
Euro area	1.3	-6.6	5.0	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.5	4.0
India	4.0	-8.0	9.5	8.5	8.3	7.5	6.7	9.9	11.0	5.8
Japan	0.3	-4.8	2.4	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.1	3.5	1.8
UK	1.4	-9.9	6.8	5.0	na	na	6.7	5.2	na	na
Australia	1.9	-2.4	3.5	4.1	na	na	4.0	3.3	4.3*	2.5*
New Zealand	2.2	-3.0	5.1	3.3	na	na	3.5	3.8	3.2†	4.4†
World	2.8	-3.3	5.9	4.9	5.6	4.3	5.7	4.5	6.0	4.5
World trade	0.9	-8.5	9.7	6.7	8.3	6.3	na	na	na	na

Note: * Forecasts for fiscal years beginning 1st July (and finishing 30th June following year) † Forecasts by New Zealand Treasury for fiscal years beginning 1st July
Sources : International Monetary Fund (IMF), *World Economic Outlook*, 12th October 2021; The World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*, 8th June 2021; Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD), *Economic Outlook, Interim Report*, 21st September 2021; Australian Treasury, 2021-22 *Budget Paper No. 1, Statement No. 2*, 11th May 2021; New Zealand Treasury, *Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2021*, 20th May 2021. Return to "What's New".

The IMF's latest forecast makes largely offsetting revisions to its outlook for economic growth, but upward revisions to its outlook for inflation

IMF real GDP growth forecasts

	October forecast (%)		Revision from July (pc pts)	
	2021	2022	2021	2022
Advanced economies				
US	6.0	5.1	-1.0	+0.3
Euro zone	5.0	4.2	+0.4	0.0
Japan	2.4	3.2	-0.4	+0.2
UK	6.8	5.0	-0.2	+0.2
Australia	3.5	4.1	-1.8	+1.1
New Zealand	5.1	3.3	+1.1	+0.1
Emerging economies				
China	8.0	5.6	-0.1	-0.1
India	9.5	8.5	0.0	0.0
ASEAN	2.9	5.8	-1.4	-0.5
Brazil	5.2	1.5	-0.1	-0.4
Russia	4.7	2.9	+0.3	-0.2
World	*5.7*	*4.5*	*-0.1*	*0.0*

Source: IMF *World Economic Outlook*, 12th October 2021.
Return to "What's New".

- The IMF's latest *World Economic Outlook* lowers its growth forecasts for the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia this year, offset by upward revisions for the euro area and commodity-exporting EMs – but with only minor changes to its outlook for 2022
- The key point in the IMF's growth outlook is the "further divergence across two blocs of countries: those that can look forward to further normalization later this year (almost all advanced economies) and those that will struggle with the adverse health and economic impacts from resurgent infections"
  - advanced economies (as a group) are expected to regain their pre-pandemic trend growth path in 2022 and exceed it by 0.9% in 2024 – whereas emerging & developing economies (ex China) GDP is expected to remain 5½% below the pre-pandemic forecast in 2024
  - this divergence results from "large disparities in vaccine access" and significant differences in "policy support" – with EMs "withdrawing policy support more quickly despite larger shortfalls in output"
- By contrast the IMF has revised its inflation forecasts upwards
  - inflation in advanced economies is expected to average 2.8% this year and 2.3% in 2022 (upward revisions of 0.4 and 0.2 pc pts), and in EMs 5.5% and 4.9% respectively (up 0.1 and 0.2 pc pts)
  - which it attributes to "a combination of pandemic-induced supply-demand mismatches, rising commodity prices and policy developments", exchange rate depreciations (in some countries), and tight labour markets
- The IMF says the balance of risks for economic growth is "tilted to the downside" whereas inflation risks are "skewed to the upside"

The IMF sees a growing divide between 'advanced' and 'emerging' economies based on vaccination rates and the amount of policy support

Vaccination rates



Output losses relative to pre-pandemic trend



Stance of fiscal policy



Employment losses relative to pre-pandemic trend



'EMs' = 'Emerging market' economies

'DEs' = Developing economies

'AEs' = 'Advanced' economies

Source: IMF *World Economic Outlook*, 12th October 2021. Return to "What's New".

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World trade volumes rose 0.7% in August, after falling 2.1% between March and July – and should recover further over the next three months or so

World trade volumes and container throughput



Taiwan export orders and world trade volumes



Note: The shipping container throughput index is based on reports from 91 ports around the world handling over 60% of global container shipping.
Sources: CPB Netherlands Economic Planning Bureau, *World Trade Monitor* (September data to be released on 25th November); Institute of Shipping Economics & Logistics (ISL) and RWI Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI) *Container Throughput Index*; Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs. Return to "What's New".

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The global ‘delta wave’ interrupted the recovery in travel during Q3 – and after an apparent recovery, global flight traffic seems to be faltering again

Daily commercial flights worldwide



Daily US TSA ‘security’ checks



Note: Commercial flights include commercial passenger flights, cargo flights, charter flights, and some business jet flights. Daily flights data up to 12th November, and TSA checks up to 11th November. Thicker coloured lines are 7-day centred moving averages of daily data plotted in thin grey lines. *Sources:* Flightradar24.com; US Transport Safety Administration (at last, something useful produced by aviation ‘security’!!!). Return to "What's New“.

Fiscal policy in almost all major economies is set to tighten significantly in 2022

United States



Euro area



Canada



Australia



Japan



United Kingdom



China



New Zealand



General government overall fiscal balance (left scale)

General government net debt (right scale)

Note: China debt is gross debt, not net. *Sources:* International Monetary Fund, *Fiscal Monitor*, and *World Economic Outlook*, October 2021. Return to "What's New"

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Major central banks have cut interest rates to record lows, and done more 'quantitative easing' than during the global financial crisis

Major central bank policy interest rates



Major central bank balance sheets



Note: estimates of central bank assets as a pc of GDP in Q2 2020 were inflated by the sharp drop in nominal GDP in that quarter: conversely, declines in estimates of central bank assets as a pc of GDP in Q3 2020 are in large part due to rebounds in nominal GDP. *Sources:* US Federal Reserve; European Central Bank; Bank of Japan; Bank of England; Bank of Canada; national statistical agencies; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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The Fed decided, as expected, to start 'tapering' its asset purchases this month, but the Bank of England surprised by not raising rates

- **After its FOMC meeting on 3rd November, the US Federal Reserve announced that it would begin 'tapering' its asset purchases (as expected)**
  - "later this month", the Fed will lower its purchases of US Treasury securities from US$80bn to $70bn a month, and its purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities from $40bn to $35bn a month
  - these purchases will be reduced to a monthly pace of $60bn and $30bn, respectively, in December, with similar reductions "likely [to be] appropriate each month" (implying that asset purchases will have ceased altogether by June next year)
- **However at his post-FOMC meeting press conference Fed Chair Jerome Powell sought to emphasize that this decision did "not imply any direct signal" about interest rates, with a "different and more stringent test for economic conditions" needing to be met "before raising the federal funds rate"**
- **Chair Powell acknowledged that inflation "is running well above [the Fed's] 2% longer-run goal" but insisted that the economy "will adjust to supply and demand imbalances and that, as it does, inflation will decline to … much closer to … 2%"**
  - he asserted that the Fed's tools "cannot ease supply constraints" but that if it were to see "signs that inflation, or longer-term inflation expectations, was moving materially and persistently beyond" the 2% target, it would "use [its] tools to preserve price stability"
- **The Bank of England surprised markets by keeping its bank rate unchanged at 0.1% and its 'envelope' for asset purchases unchanged at £895 bn at this month's MPC meeting (markets had anticipated a 15 bp rate increase)**
  - the decision appears to have been grounded in downward revisions to forecasts of GDP growth in the second half of 2021, together with a view that "there was value in waiting for additional information on near-term developments in the labour market … before deciding when a tightening in monetary policy might be warranted"
  - however the MPC judged that "it would be necessary over coming months to increase [the] bank rate in order to return CPI inflation sustainably to the 2% target" from what was now expected to be a peak of 5% in April next year, "materially higher than had been expected in August"

The ECB and the BoJ left rates on hold at their most recent meetings – with neither giving any hint of thinking about raising them – unlike the BoC

- The European Central Bank left its policy interest rates unchanged (as expected) at its last meeting on 28th October, but foreshadowed a mild 'tapering' of its bond purchases
  - it will continue to purchase bonds within its 'total envelope' of €1,850bn 'at least until the end of March 2022' but will do so at a 'moderately lower pace' than in the second and third quarters of this year
  - ECB President Christine Lagarde acknowledged that "the current phase of higher inflation will last longer than originally expected", but nonetheless insisted that ("after a lot of soul-searching to test our analysis") the factors responsible for this (energy prices, supply chain disruptions and 'base effects' flowing from the end of the temporary VAT reduction in Germany) will "ease in the course of 2022"
- The Bank of Japan left all of its monetary policy settings on hold, as expected, at its 28th October Monetary Policy Board meeting
  - Policy Board members lowered their forecast for real GDP growth in FY2021 to 3.4% (from 3.8% in July) – mainly due to near-term weakness in exports (especially of motor vehicles) and in household services consumption (as a result of ongoing public health measures) – but raise it for FY2022 to 2.9% (from 2.7%), and lowered their CPI inflation forecast for FY2021 to 0% (from 0.6%) while leaving the FY2022 forecast unchanged at 0.9%
  - unlike most other central banks. the BoJ sees risks to prices as still being "skewed to the downside", as are the near-term risks to economic activity
- The Bank of Canada ended its quantitative easing program at last month's Governing Council meeting (although it will continue to purchase bonds to replace maturing bonds in its portfolio)
  - in its Monetary Policy Report the BoC lowered its forecasts for Canadian GDP growth in 2021 by 0.9 pc pt to 5.1%, and in 2022 by 0.3 pc pt to 4.3%, but raised its inflation forecasts for 2021 by 0.4 pc pt to 3.4%, and for 2022 by 1.0 pc pt to 3.4%
  - the BoC noted that "the main factors pushing up prices - higher energy prices and pandemic-related supply bottlenecks – now appear to be stronger and more persistent than expected" – and the output gap is now expected to close "some time in the middle quarters of 2022" (which is when the BoC will likely begin raising its overnight rate target, currently 0.25%), earlier than previously indicated

Return to "What's New".

Money supply growth has slowed sharply from the peaks recorded earlier this year as large monthly increases a year ago ‘wash out’

US M2



Euro area M2



Australia M3



Japan M2 + CDs



UK M2



New Zealand M3



Sources: US Federal Reserve; European Central Bank; Bank of Japan; Bank of England; RBA; RBNZ. Return to "What's New“.

The OECD estimates that higher commodity prices and shipping costs account for three-quarters of the increase in G20 inflation so far this year

Inflation in major advanced economies



Contribution to annual G20 inflation



Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, Interim Report, 21st September 2021.

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The factors which have contributed to ‘upstream’ price pressures in recent months seem to have peaked (at least for now)

‘Hard’ commodity prices



Crude oil price



Shipping freight costs



‘Soft’ commodity prices



Natural gas prices



Semiconductor chip prices



Note: The European natural gas price is the Netherlands TTF forward day ahead price, up to September; the October and November data are derived by adjusting the September value for subsequent movements in the UK natural gas price (for which daily data are available. The Asian natural gas price is that of Indonesian LNG in Japan. *Sources:* International Monetary Fund; Freightos; Drewry; The Baltic Exchange; Refinitiv Datastream;

Taiwanese export orders data for September suggests that semi-conductor chip production is starting to recover

Taiwan export orders, by product



Note: Data have been seasonally adjusted by Corinna using Refinitiv Datastream. Latest data are for September. *Source:* Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs. Return to "What's New".

- Taiwan accounts for 63% of the US$85bn global semi-conductor chip market (followed by Korea 18% and China 6%)
  - one Taiwanese company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) has 54% of the world market, and United Microelectronics Co (UMC) a further 7% (Samsung accounts for Korea's 18%)
- Semiconductor fabrication plants ("fabs") use very large amounts of water to rinse chips during their manufacture – a typical fab uses 7½-15 million litres of water daily (and water in Taiwan is very cheap, at less than US40¢/t)
- Taiwan had been experiencing its worst drought in 56 years, resulting in rationing of water supplies including to semi-conductor manufacturers
  - although recent heavy rainfalls appear to have broken the drought
- World-wide semi-conductor production has also been crimped by plant shutdowns in Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines due to covid-19 outbreaks, and by damage caused by a fire at a Japanese fab earlier this year and a storm at a Texas plant
- Shortages of semi-conductor chips have caused major headaches for the motor vehicle industry (which uses lots of them)
  - Toyota cut in production by 40% in September (although virus outbreaks in SE Asia were also a contributing factor)
- Foreign orders for Taiwanese ICT products rose by 9.2% in September, and orders for other electronics products rose 5.5%
  - to be 10.0% and 8.7% respectively below their previous peaks

Producer prices are surging in all major economies: but only in the US and the UK is this feeding into markedly higher core CPI inflation

United States



Euro area



Canada



Japan



United Kingdom



Sweden



For a more detailed analysis of recent US inflation data see slides 71-77. *Sources:* US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Statistics Bureau of Japan; Eurostat; UK Office for National Statistics; Statistics Canada; Statistics Sweden. Return to "What's New".

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There's been very little pass-through of higher producer prices into 'core' consumer price inflation in Asia

China



Taiwan



Indonesia



Thailand



Korea



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



Note: 'Core' CPIs measure different things in different Asian economies – see footnotes to slide 56. *Sources:* China National Bureau of Statistics; Statistics Korea; Bank of Korea; Taiwan Statistical Bureau; Singstat; Monetary Authority of Singapore; Statistics Indonesia; Philippine Statistics Authority; Thailand Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices; Department of Statistics Malaysia. Return to "What's New".

Consumer price inflation is rising in many other ‘emerging’ markets

Brazil



Argentina



Russia



Hungary



South Africa



Mexico



Chile



Czechia



Poland



Turkey



Sources: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (Mexico); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (Argentina); Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (Chile); Rosstat; Český statistický úřad (Czechia); Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungary); Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Poland); Statistics South Africa; Turkstat. Return to "What's New".

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Residential property prices have been remarkably resilient in most countries thanks to record-low interest rates and ample supply of credit

House price indices



Note: House price indices shown in these charts are those published by S&P-CoreLogic Case Shiller national (United States); Teranet-National Bank (Canada); CoreLogic (Australia); Real Estate Institute of New Zealand; China Index Academy; Japan Real Estate Institute (Tokyo condominiums); Kookmin Bank house price index (Korea); Centaline Centa-City Index (Hong Kong); Urban Redevelopment Authority (Singapore); Europace hauspreisindex (Germany); Halifax house price index (UK); Central Statistics Office RPPI (Ireland); Fotocasa real estate index (Spain); Statistics Netherlands; Eiendom Norge (Norway). These indices have been chosen for their timeliness and widespread recognition: they do not necessarily all measure the same thing in the same way. For more comprehensive residential property price data see the quarterly database maintained by the Bank for International Settlements. Return to "What's New".

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Bond yields rose after this week's US inflation data but remain below late October highs, US stocks were marginally lower, and the US$ rose

Stock markets



10-year bond yields



Measures of market volatility



US dollar vs euro and yen



Source: Refintiv Datastream. Data up to 12th November. [Return to "What's New"](#).

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October PMIs show a strong rebound in manufacturing in SE Asia, with some easing in most 'advanced' economies, and mostly stronger services activity



Note: Purchasing Managers' Indexes (PMIs) are derived from surveys of senior executives, who are asked to report whether various dimensions of business activity recorded an increase, decrease or no change compared with the previous month. Latest data are for October. A reading of 50 indicates an overall increase cf. the previous month, and a reading of less than 50 indicates a decrease. See also PMIs for other Asia-Pacific economies on slide 56. Sources: US Institute for Supply Management; IHS Markit; JP Morgan; Caixin; Refinitiv Datastream. Return to "What's New".

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China's real GDP grew by only 0.2% in Q3, cutting the annual growth rate to just 4.9%, the slowest in at least 30 years except for last year

Real GDP growth, from year earlier, 1961-2021



Quarterly real GDP growth, 2010-2021



Note: In the left-hand chart, GDP growth rates are annual averages up to the December quarter of 1991, and then quarter-on-corresponding-quarter-of- previous-year thereafter. *Source:* China National Bureau of Statistics. Return to "What's New".

China racked up a record US$84½bn trade surplus in October thanks to continued strength in exports

Industrial production



Motor vehicle production



Merchandise trade



Steel and cement production



Freight traffic volumes



Merchandise trade balance



Note: Latest data are for September, except for merchandise trade which are for October. *Sources:* China National Bureau of Statistics; China Association of Automobile Manufacturers; China General Administration of Customs. Return to "What's New".

Consumer spending and property construction activity were also weak throughout the September quarter

Consumer sentiment



Motor vehicle sales



Real estate investment



Volume of retail sales



Passenger traffic volumes



Residential real estate prices



Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics; China Association of Automobile Manufacturers; China Index Academy (CIA). Latest data are for September, except for Soufun/CIA house price index which is October. Return to "What's New".

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Producer price inflation is at a record high, and consumer price inflation though still low is creeping up – while monetary policy remains unchanged

Producer prices



PBoC policy interest rates



Bank reserve requirement ratios



Consumer prices



Market interest rates



Credit growth



Note: 'SHIBOR' is the Shanghai Inter-Bank Offered Rate. Latest inflation and credit data are for October.
Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics; Refintiv Datastream; People's Bank of China. Return to "What's New".

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China Evergrande staved off default for the third time this week when it made another interest payment just before the ‘grace period’ expired

- Concerns have been mounting for some weeks about the possibility of a default by China Evergrande Group, a property development company with debts totalling US$300 billion (of which US$37bn falls due within a year)
  - Evergrande is China’s second-largest property developer, with around 200,000 employees, and owns more than 1,300 different projects in some 280 cities (and indirect management interests in 2,800 others) across China, as well as having interests in electric vehicle manufacturing
  - its founder and chairman, Xu Jiayin (aka Hui Ka Yan), was once “Asia’s richest man”, and has had strong connections with senior Chinese leaders including former Premier Wen Jiabao
- A collapse of Evergrande could likely have significant consequences for the broader Chinese financial system
  - but it’s not clear whether a government-sponsored ‘rescue’ would be consistent with the recent government emphasis on steering lending away from real estate development or with regulatory crack-downs on prominent entrepreneurs
- Evergrande this week once again avoided a formal default this week by making payment of US$148mn on interest which had been due on 11th October, ahead of the expiry of the 30-day ‘grace period’ on Wednesday
  - this is the third time Evergrande has made an interest payment on the latest possible date – there is another interest payment of $255mn due on 28th December
- At least four other (much smaller) property developers have defaulted in recent weeks
  - Kaisa Group, which reportedly owes more to offshore bond-holders than any Chinese property development company except Evergrande, was due to make $59mn in interest payments at the end of this week, but has asked investors for "time and patience” to solve its “liquidity problems”
- Director of the PBoC’s Financial Market Department Zou Lan last month said that Evergrande’s problems are “an isolated phenomenon in the real estate industry” and that, although “the company has been poorly managed” and had “blindly diversified and expanded”, the “risk of its spillover to the financial industry is controllable” and “the real estate industry is generally healthy”

Return to "What's New“.

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The Chinese banking system's risk profile has increased significantly over the past decade – particularly on the liabilities side of its balance sheet

Credit outstanding as a pc of GDP



Banks' assets



Banks' deposits-to-loans ratio



Credit outstanding by sector



Banks' liabilities



Banks NPLs – official estimates



Sources: People's Bank of China; Bank for International Settlements; China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. Return to "What's New".

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The yuan has rise by 2.3% against the US$, and by 6.3% in trade-weighted terms, so far this year, underpinned by China's rising trade surplus

Chinese renminbi vs US$ and trade-weighted index



FX reserves and domestic credit



Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; China Foreign Exchange Trading System; People's Bank of China. Exchange rates up to 12th November; FX reserves data are up to October, and domestic credit data are up to September. Return to "What's New".

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Employment in Japan fell in September for the second month in a row, to be 1.6% below the pre-pandemic peak, but unemployment stayed at 2.8%

Real GDP



Consumer confidence



Unemployment



BoJ *Tankan* business conditions



Value of retail sales



Merchandise export volumes



Sources: Japan Cabinet Office Economic and Social Research Institute; Bank of Japan; Statistics Bureau of Japan; Japan Ministry of Finance. Return to "What's New".

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Indonesia's economy shrank by 1.4% in Q3 due to the surge in covid-infections, to be only 3.5% ahead of Q3 2020

Korea



Hong Kong

Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan

Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Sources: Bank of Korea; Taiwan Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics; Hong Kong Census & Statistics Department; Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry; Department of Statistics Malaysia; Office of the National Economic & Social Development Council of Thailand; Statistics Indonesia; Philippine Statistics Authority; General Statistics Office of Viet Nam; India Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation. Return to "What's New".

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PMIs suggest a strong recovery in manufacturing in SE Asian economies previously hit by delta outbreaks, and steady growth elsewhere



Note: Purchasing Managers' Indexes (PMIs) are derived from surveys of senior executives, who are asked to report whether various dimensions of business activity recorded an increase, decrease or no change compared with the previous month. A reading of 50 indicates an overall increase cf. the previous month, and a reading of less than 50 indicates a decrease. Latest data are for October, except for NZ services which is September. Sources: IHS Markit; Singapore Institute of Purchasing and Materials Management; Australian Industry Group; Business NZ; Refinitiv Datastream. Return to "What's New".

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Some (though not all) Asian economies are experiencing temporary upward pressure on inflation as in North America and Europe

Korea



Hong Kong



Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Note: 'Core' inflation in Korea excludes agricultural products and oil; in Taiwan it excludes fresh fruit, vegetables and energy; in Singapore it excludes accommodation and private transport; and in Hong Kong it excludes the effect of 'one-off government relief measures. 'Core' inflation in Indonesia excludes 'volatile foods' and changes in 'administered prices' (such as fuel subsidies, transport fares and electricity prices); in the Philippines it excludes rice, corn, meat, fish, cultivated vegetables and fuels; in Thailand it excludes fresh or raw food and energy; and in Malaysia it excludes fresh food and 'administered' prices. Vietnam and India do not publish measures of 'core' inflation. Sources: national statistical agencies and central banks. Return to "What's New".

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Unemployment rose sharply in most Asian economies last year but is now falling in most of them

Korea



Hong Kong



Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Note: Unemployment data is published monthly in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia; quarterly in Singapore and the Philippines; semi-annually (February and August) in Indonesia; and annually in Vietnam (with the latest reading being for 2019). There is no official unemployment data in India: the estimates shown on this page are compiled by a private sector 'think tank'. Sources: national statistical agencies; Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy . Return to "What's New".

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Asian exports are recovering from the Covid-induced slump – although 'base effects' from this time last year are inflating the growth

Korea



Hong Kong



Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Note: Data for Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are published in national currencies and converted to US dollars by Corinna using month-average exchange rates.
Sources: national statistical agencies and central banks. Return to "What's New".

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All Asian economies have experienced improvements in their trade balances since the onset of Covid, although some are now turning around

Korea



Hong Kong



Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Note: Data for Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are published in national currencies and converted to US dollars by Corinna using month-average exchange rates.
Sources: national statistical agencies and central banks. Return to "What's New".

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Apart from Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand, Asian governments' discretionary fiscal responses to Covid-19 have been relatively modest

Fiscal policy responses to Covid-19 – Asian & other selected emerging market economies



Budget balances – Asian economies 2020-2022



Gross government debt – Asian economies 2019-26



Note: 'Above the line' measures comprise additional or accelerated spending and deferred or foregone revenue. 'Below the line' measures comprise equity injections, loans, asset purchases and debt assumptions, but do not include loan guarantees or other contingent liabilities. 'DMs' means 'developed markets' (or 'advanced economies'). Data includes measures announced up until 27th September 2021. Singapore's apparently very large gross debt is offset by substantial financial asset holdings. Taiwan's gross debt is projected to decline as a percentage of GDP between 2019 and 2026. *Sources:* IMF, *Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic*, October 2021; and *Fiscal Monitor*, October 2021. Return to "What's New".

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Asian governments, except for Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, will be running large budget deficits for the next five years



Source: International Monetary Fund, *Fiscal Monitor*, and *World Economic Outlook*, October 2021. Return to "What's New"

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The Thai and Malaysia central banks left their policy settings on hold this month, as will the Indonesian and Philippine central banks this coming week

- **The Bank of Thailand left its policy rate unchanged at 0.50% (as it has been since May last year) at is Monetary Policy Committee meeting on Wednesday**
  - the MPC assessed that the Thai economy had "bottomed out" in Q3 and "entered the recovery phase following the relaxation of containment measures and the re-opening of the country" with downside risks to growth having decreased "on account of the accelerated vaccination progress"
  - headline inflation was expected to "increase temporarily owing to supply-side factors" but would nevertheless "remain within the [1-3%] target, noting the "upside risks" of "elevated global energy prices persisting longer than expected and global supply constraints becoming more prolonged" but also that "the slow recovery of income and purchasing power would lead to subdued demand-side inflationary pressures"
  - hence the MPC would continue to "put emphasis on supporting the economic recovery"
- **Bank Negara Malaysia left its overnight policy rate at 1.75% (where it has been since August last year) at last week's Monetary Policy Committee meeting**
  - the Committee noted that economic activity had "recovered from the trough in July" in line with the relaxation of public health restrictions imposed during Q2 and the early part of Q3, and that "growth momentum is expected to improve going into 2022" – but also that "risks to the growth outlook … remain tilted to the downside"
  - the MPC expected headline inflation to "average within the projected range of 2-3% for 2021" and to "remain moderate moving into 2022", while core inflation is expected to "edge upwards" (from less than 1% in 2021) but "remain benign given the continued spare capacity in the economy and slack in the labour market"
- **Next Asian central bank policy meetings are Bank Indonesia and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, both on 18th November, and Bank of Korea on 25th November**
  - BI and BSP are expected to leave their monetary policy settings unchanged, but the BoK is expected to raise its key rate by 25bp (to 1.0%)

Return to "What's New".

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Apart from the Bank of Korea, and the MAS, no other Asian central bank has given any indication of an imminent policy tightening

Korea



Hong Kong



Indonesia



Thailand



Vietnam



Taiwan



Singapore



Philippines



Malaysia



India



Note: Neither Hong Kong nor Singapore use a monetary policy indicator interest rate. Hong Kong has a currency board system, so HK interest rates track US rates very closely; the Monetary Authority of Singapore uses the (effective) exchange rate as its principal monetary policy instrument. Data are monthly averages up to November 2021.
Sources: national central banks; Refinitiv Datastream. Return to "What's New".

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The Thai baht, Philippine peso, Indonesian rupiah and Korean won strengthened vs the US$ this week, but the S$, ringgit and rupee eased

Asian currency exchange rates vs US dollar



Note: Data up to 12th November. Source: Refinitiv Datastream. Return to "What's New".

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Bank Indonesia's monetary policy settings have been on hold since January although it has continued with its 'synergistic monetary expansion'

Indonesia budget deficit



BI monetary policy rates



Bank lending



BI holdings of tradeable SBNs



- **In April 2020, the Indonesian Government and Bank Indonesia (BI) agreed to a 'burden-sharing' scheme under which BI will directly purchase bonds equivalent to 25% of this year's budget financing requirement (and return the interest received to the Government), as well as subsidizing interest payments on other bonds**
  - BI calls this 'synergistic monetary expansion'
  - up to 15th October BI has purchased Rp 143trn of SBN in the primary market (cf. Rp 473trn in 2020)
  - BI has indicated that it will be a 'standby buyer' for up to one-quarter of government borrowing requirements through 2022
- **BI's holdings of SBNs have risen by Rp115bn over the past five weeks, reversing most of the Rp166bn decline over the previous four weeks**
  - BI has absorbed 37% of the increase in the total stock of SBNs outstanding so far this year, cf. just 17% in 2020
- **This 'QE' isn't adding to inflationary pressure because lending to the private sector is declining**
  - 'core' inflation at 1.3% in October is well below BI's target of 2-4% (slide 56) and BI expects it to remain within target in 2021 and 2022
- **BI again left its policy settings unchanged at last month's Governing Council meeting**
  - the next meeting is this Thursday

Sources: Indonesia Ministry of Finance (Kementarian Keuangan); Directorate of Government Debt Securities; Bank Indonesia.

Return to "What's New".

US consumer sentiment fell sharply in November, to its lowest level in 10 years, reflecting concerns about rising inflation

Real GDP



Consumer sentiment



'Core' retail sales



NY Fed weekly economic index



Housing starts



Industrial production



Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Michigan University Survey Research Center; US Commerce Department; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Return to "What's New".

The Covid-19 recession has been quite unlike any other of the recessions the US has experienced since the end of World War II

Level of real GDP



Non-farm payroll employment



Unemployment rate



Note: 'average post-war recession' is the average of figures for each of the eleven post-war US recessions as designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee, with the exception of the recession of January-July 1980 (which was too short, and too close to the July 1981-November 1982 recession to be fully reflected in the averages shown here); 'Peak quarter' is the quarter in which real GDP attained its highest level before the onset of the recession. No recession was ever as 'smooth' as implied by the averages shown here. *Sources:* US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics. Return to "What's New".

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The differences between this recession and previous ones are even more apparent from some of the details in the national accounts

Personal disposable income



Personal saving rate



After-tax corporate profits



Labour productivity



Personal consumption



Residential investment



Business investment



Federal budget balance



Note: 'average post-war recession' is the average of figures for each of the eleven post-war US recessions as designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee, with the exception of the recession of January-July 1980; 'peak quarter' is the quarter in which real GDP attained its highest level before the onset of the recession. All variables in the charts above are in 2012 chain volumes except for the personal saving ratio and budget deficit; after-tax profits are 'economic' rather than 'book' profits; labour productivity is for the non-farm business sector. *Sources:* US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Return to "What's New".

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Recurring cash payments to households (combined with restrictions on movement) have had a major impact on US consumer spending patterns

Tax and transfer payments



Real personal income



Real consumption expenditure



Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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US non-farm payrolls gained 0.4% in October but were still 2.8% below the pre-pandemic peak, while the unemployment rate is still 1.1 pc pt higher

Unemployment benefit claims



Hours worked (private sector)



Labour force participation rate



Non-farm payroll employment



Unemployment rate



Employment to population ratio



Sources: US Department of Labor; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; National Bureau of Economic Research Macro History database. November employment and other labour force data will be released on 3rd December. Return to "What's New".

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Most of the contributors to the ‘spike’ in ‘core’ inflation earlier this year have since abated – but higher inflation is now becoming more broadly-based

Contributions to recent monthly changes in CPI excluding food and energy



Price indices for items which have contributed most to recent monthly changes in the ‘core’ US CPI (rebased to December 2019 = 100)



Note: ‘HOER’ = home-owners’ equivalent rent (a measure of the ‘imputed rent’ notionally paid by owner-occupiers to themselves), and which accounts for 28½% of the CPI excluding food and energy. *Source:* US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Table 6; Corinna. Return to "What's New“.

'Statistical' measures of 'underlying' inflation are also beginning to pick up – although longer-term inflation expectations remain 'well anchored'

Alternative measures of US 'core' CPI inflation



- Statistical measures of 'underlying' CPI inflation are now rising more rapidly – the annual 'trimmed mean' inflation rate in October was the highest since July 1991

Alternative measures of US 'core' PCE deflator inflation



- The trimmed mean measure of 'under-lying' PCE deflator inflation has also picked up in recent months (although not as much as the trimmed mean CPI)

Household inflationary expectations



- Short-term household inflation expectations have risen sharply, but the Fed will draw some comfort from the fact that longer-term expectations remain "well-anchored"

Note: The 'trimmed mean' CPI inflation rate excludes the components of the CPI whose weights fall in the top and bottom 8% of the distribution of price changes; the median is the component whose price change is in the middle of the distribution of price changes. The 'trimmed mean' of the PCE deflator excludes 24% by weight from the lower tail and 31% by weight from the upper tail of the ranked distribution of price changes. *Sources:* US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; and Michigan University Survey Research Center. Return to "What's New".

PCE price deflators highlight the significant role of durable goods in the ‘disinflation’ of the past 20 years and the more recent ‘spike’ in inflation

Implicit price deflators of personal consumption expenditures – per cent changes over 12-month intervals







Implicit price deflators of personal consumption expenditures – levels







Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Return to "What's New".

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There have been some serious supply-chain difficulties in the US – particularly in the auto sector – but they may have now peaked

Manufacturers’ order backlogs



Lead-time for production materials



Motor vehicles & parts production



Manufacturers’ customer inventories



Reasons for < full capacity



Auto industry capacity utilization



Note: The diffusion index of order backlogs is 50 plus the percentage of respondents reporting longer backlogs minus the percentage reporting shorter backlogs (and similarly for customer inventories). ‘Reasons for < full capacity’ means reasons for operating at less than full capacity. *Sources:* Institute for Supply Management, *Report on Business*; US Census Bureau, *Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization*; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, *Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization - G17*.
‘Return to "What's New"‘.

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Survey measures also suggest that 'upstream' price pressures in the US may be peaking, for goods although perhaps less so for services

Philadelphia Fed survey – prices



ISM survey – prices paid



'Philadelphia Fed survey – prices received



Import prices (excluding petroleum)



Note: The usefulness of the Business Outlook surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia is that the area which it covers (eastern and central Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey and Delaware) is a reasonable proxy for the broader US economy. *Sources:* Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Institute for Supply Management; US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 'Return to "What's New".

The so-called 'Great Resignation' may mean the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment ('NAIRU') is higher than the Fed thinks

Job openings



Average hourly earnings



Overall wages growth - monthly



Quit rate

The record high 'quit rate' is the main evidence for the so-called 'Great Resignation' – although the 'record' only goes back to January 2001, and there would seem to be an element of 'catch-up' for this year for the unusually low rate last year



Average hourly earnings



Wages growth - quarterly



Note: Measures of average hourly earnings (especially the all-industries measures) and of average compensation per hour are affected by changes in the composition of employment (so for example they rose sharply in Q2 2020 when large numbers of low-paid workers were laid off and fell markedly when they returned to work) whereas the Atlanta Fed 'wage growth tracker' (which tracks the wage growth of individuals) and the wages component of the ECI (which is very similar to the ABS' Wage Price Index) are not. *Sources:* US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, Current Employment Statistics, Employment Cost Trends and Labor Productivity and Costs.

'Return to "What's New"'.

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US labour market tightness owes a lot to restrictions on immigration, and to barriers to the return to the labour market of specific groups

Civilian working age population



‘E-pop’ ratio – by education



‘E-pop’ ratio – women 25-54



Employment-to-population ratio



‘E-Pop’ ratio – Blacks & Hispanics



‘E-pop’ ratio – people 55 & over



Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics.

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The US Federal Government's gross debt topped US$30trn in October – and Congress has approved one of the Administration's two big spending bills

US Federal budget deficit



US gross Federal debt



- **The US Federal Government budget deficit widened by US$104bn to $165bn in October, although that was considerably less than the $284bn deficit incurred in October last year**
- **For the 12 months ended October the budget deficit totalled $2.66 trn (13.8% of GDP), down from a peak of $4.1 trn (22.2% of GDP) in the 12 months ended June**
- **The Treasury issued an unusually large amount of debt during October, pushing the market value of total debt on issue up by $453bn to $30.0trn (156.8% of GDP) – although $12.3 trn of this amount is held by the Federal Reserve or US Government trust accounts (eg Social Security)**
- **Congress has passed legislation raising the US Government's debt ceiling by US$480bn, which in effect allows the Government to continue operating until around 3rd December**
- **Last week Congress finally passed the Biden Administration's $1.2trn (over 5 years) infra-structure spending bill – but the outlook for the larger social and climate spending bill remains highly uncertain**

Note: The measure of US gross federal debt is at market value. *Sources:* US Treasury Department; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; US Congressional Budget Office; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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Any ‘excess demand’ resulting from ‘excessive’ stimulus is more likely to show up in the US current account deficit than in sustained higher inflation

US current account balance



The US current account has *widened* since the recession that began last year – and in the first half of this year has been larger (as a pc of GDP) than at any time since the financial crisis

Gross saving and investment



Investment *didn’t* fall much during this recession – perhaps because it didn’t rise as much as usual during the preceding expansion (corporate tax cuts notwithstanding)

Gross saving by sector



The dramatic increase in the budget deficit has been largely (but not totally) offset by an increase in house-hold saving

Note: shaded areas denote recessions as designated by the US National Bureau of Economic Research. Data up to Q2 2021.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Return to "What's New“.

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The US recorded a new record goods and services trade deficit in September, and 2021 is likely to exceed the record of US$755bn set in 2006

US goods trade balance



US services trade balance



US bilateral goods trade balances



US goods & services trade balance



- **The US goods trade deficit widened by US$8.9 bn to a new record $98.2bn in September**
  - exports fell 4.7% (largely driven by a 10% fall in exports of industrial supplies and materials) while imports rose 0.8%
  - the merchandise trade deficit is likely to exceed US$1 trn in 2021 for the second year in a row
- **The services surplus widened by $0.8bn to $17.2bn**
  - services exports rose 0.9% and imports fell 0.4%
- **The combined goods and services deficit in September was a record $80.9bn, $7.7bn more than the previous record in June**
  - for the first nine months of 2021 the goods and services deficit was $639bn, compared with $480bn in the first nine months of 2020
  - the deficit would need to shrink to an average of less than $39bn a month for the 2021 total not to exceed 2006's record of $755bn
- **This is where 'excess demand' is showing up in a sustained way, rather than in sustained higher inflation**

Source: US Census Bureau. Return to "What's New".

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Employment in Canada rose another 0.2% in October, although the unemployment rate is still more than 1 pc pt above its pre-pandemic low

Real GDP



Unemployment rate



Merchandise trade balance



Consumer prices



Housing permits



Federal budget balance



Sources: Statistics Canada; Department of Finance Canada. Return to "What's New".

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The UK economy grew a slower-than-expected 1.3% in Q3, to be still 2.1% below its pre-pandemic peak, cf. a 0.5% shortfall for the euro area

Euro area real GDP



Consumer confidence



Retail sales volume



UK real GDP



Household saving ratio



Unemployment



Sources: Eurostat; UK Office for National Statistics; GfK. The UK unemployment rate is published as a 3-month moving average.

Return to "What's New".

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UK business confidence has also fallen sharply as energy prices have spiked, while UK exports have stagnated since ‘Brexit’

Business confidence



Housing activity



Government fiscal balance



Manufacturing production



Merchandise exports



Current account balance



Sources: Confederation of British Industry; Eurostat; UK Office for National Statistics. Return to "What's New".

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The 2021 UK Autumn Budget Review 'bakes in' a large increase in the size of the British state – not what one would expect from the Conservatives

Public sector net borrowing



Sources of change in PSNB



Public sector net debt



Tax & spending as pc of GDP



- The UK Government's Autumn Budget and Spending Review revised down the deficits forecast for the five years to FY2025-26 by £154bn (27%) from what had been forecast in March
- The improvement is largely the result of favourable 'parameter variations' (mainly stronger forecast nominal GDP growth) and tax increases announced since the March Budget
  - in particular, the 1¼% health and social care levy announced by the Chancellor in September
- Together with the increases in personal and corporate income tax announced in the March Budget, these will result in tax revenue rising by 2026-27 to its highest share of GDP since 1950
  - the independent Office for Budget Responsibility says that taxes have been raised by more this year than in any single year since 1993

Sources: UK Office for Budget Responsibility; HM Treasury.

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Central banks in Latin America and Eastern Europe are continuing to raise rates

- Banco de México raised its overnight interbank rate another 25 bp, to 5%, at its Governing Board meeting on Thursday, the fourth such increase since June
  - the latest increase follows upward revisions to its near-term inflation forecasts, with 'core' inflation expected to peak at 5.8% in Q1 next year (cf. the target of 3%), and the balance of risks remaining "biased to the upside"
- Banco Central de Reserva del Perú raised its reference rate by 50bp to 2% at its Board meeting on Thursday, following increases of 25 bp in August and 50bp in both September and October
  - the Board's post-meeting statement was less hawkish, noting that although 'headline' inflation had reached 5.8% in October, it was expected to return to the 1-3% target range "in the second half of next year" (and 'core' inflation was only 2.8%)
  - the Board noted that monetary policy was "still expansionary" and that the latest decision "does not necessarily imply a cycle of successive increases in the reference rate"
- Banco Central del Uruguay also raised its monetary policy rate by 50bp, to 5.75%, on Thursday, after increases of 25bp in August and 50 bp in October,
  - in order to "consolidate the process of reducing inflationary expectations", from almost 7% currently to "the centre of the 3-6% target range over the 24-month monetary policy horizon"
- In Eastern Europe, Banca Naţională a României (Romania's central bank) raised its monetary policy rate by another 25 bp to 1.75% at its Board meeting on Tuesday, following a similar increase at the previous meeting in October
  - the decision resulted from a "significant worsening of the inflation outlook", with inflation expected to peak at 8.6% in Q2 next year and still be at 5.9% by end-2022, cf. NBR's target of 2.5%±1 pc pt
  - the NBR Board also noted the stance of fiscal policy and "ongoing political instability" as "a substantial source of risks"
- This follows larger-than-expected rate hikes last week by Česká národní banka (the Czech National Bank) of 125 bp, to 2.75%and by Narodowy Bank Polski (Poland's central bank) of 75 bp, to 1.25%, both prompted by upward revisions to their inflation forecasts

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Return to "What's New".

A growing number of ‘emerging’ market central banks have begun tightening monetary policy

Brazil



Chile



Czechia



Russia



Georgia & Armenia



Mexico



Peru



Hungary



Poland



Pakistan & Sri Lanka



Sources: Banco Central do Brasil; Banco de México; Banco Central de Chile; Banco Central de Reserva del Perú; Česká národní banka; Magyar Nemzeti Bank; Bank Rossii; Narodowy Bank Polski; Sakartvelos Erovnuli Bank’I; Hayastani Kentronakan Bank; State Bank of Pakistan; Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Australia

Australia's real GDP likely contracted by 2½-3% in Q3 – which would constitute a 'recession' – but there's likely to be a strong rebound in Q4

Quarterly growth in Australian real GDP, 1961-2021



Note: Shaded areas denote recessions. *Source:* ABS, *Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product*, March quarter 2021. September quarter GDP will be released on 1st December; and December quarter GDP on 2nd March 2022. Return to "What's New".

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Australia's recession wasn't as severe as, and its recovery has been stronger than, most other 'advanced' economies – but will that continue?

Level of real GDP



Employment



Unemployment



Sources: ABS ; Statistics NZ ; US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics; Japan Cabinet Office and Statistics Bureau of Japan; Eurostat; and UK Office for National Statistics; Corinna.

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Though stronger-than-expected overall, the recovery in economic activity and employment has been very uneven across sectors

Q2 2021 real gross value added by industry – change from pre-pandemic peak



Q3 2021 employment by industry – change from pre-pandemic peak



Sources: ABS, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, June quarter 2021; and Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, August 2021.

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8 out of 13 industry sectors experienced a decline in turnover in September – compared with 5 in August, with the largest in utilities and construction

Indicators of business turnover, by industry



Note: The turnover indicators are derived from the Business Activity Statements submitted to the Australian Taxation Office by all businesses with an annual GST turnover of \$20mn or more (together with a proportion of smaller businesses which voluntarily report monthly). *Source:* ABS, Monthly Business Turnover Indicator, September 2021. October data will be released on 10th December. Return to "What's New".

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After revising up its inflation forecasts the RBA concedes an increase in the cash rate "could be warranted" in 2023, but emphatically not in 2022

GDP



Unemployment



Wages



'Underlying' inflation



- In its latest *Statement on Monetary Policy* RBA expects that real GDP contracted by around 2½% in Q3 but that there will be a "rapid bounce back" in Q4 and in Q1 next year such that GDP grows by 5½% over the year to Q4 2022 before slowing to 2½% through 2023
- In this 'central' scenario the RBA expects the unemployment rate to fall from 4¾% in Q4 2021 to 4¼% by Q4 2022, and the more slowly to "just above 4% by the end of 2023" …
- … in which case wage inflation is expected to pick up to "above 2% by the end of 2021" and "to be around 3% by the end of 2023"
- 'Underlying' inflation is now expected to be "around 2¼ for much of the forecast period", rising to "around 2½% by the end of 2023" …
- … which "could be consistent with the first increase in the cash rate being in 2024"
- In the SoMP the RBA also presents an 'upside' scenario "driven by stronger wealth effects [on household spending] and reduced uncertainty related to positive health outcomes" – with unemployment falling to 3¼% and inflation rising above 3% by end-2024" – in which case "an increase in the cash rate in 2023 could be warranted"
- However "the latest data and forecasts do not warrant an increase in the cash rate in 2022" in the RBA Board's view

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, *Statement on Monetary Policy*, 5th November 2021. The RBA's next set of forecasts will be published on 4th February 2022. Return to "What's New".

‘Mobility indicators’ illustrate how NSW and Victoria have begun returning to ‘normal’ as restrictions have been eased

Google mobility indicators

Workplaces



Retail and recreation



Residences



Note: data up to 8th November. *Sources:* Google Community Mobility Reports; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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The *taboo* on Australians leaving the country has more than offset the loss of spending by foreign tourists and students

Travel credits and debits



Net travel transactions



- **Over the four years to March 2020, Australians spent an average of $54bn per annum on overseas travel – as against just $1bn spend in that way over the 12 months to March 2021, 'freeing up' a large amount which appears to have been spent in other ways (electronics, household goods, clothes, cars etc.)**

- **Despite restrictions, foreigners still spent $31bn in Australia in the 12 months to March 2021 (cf. an average of $61bn per annum over the previous four years) implying a *net gain* to Australia during 12 months to March this year of almost $22½bn by comparison with the 2016-19 average – equivalent to about 1¼% of GDP**

Source: ABS, *International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia*, March 2021. Return to "What's New".

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The >$50bn per annum that Australians would have spent overseas if they’d been allowed to has instead been spent at home

Electronic & electrical goods



Hardware, building & garden supplies



Floor coverings, furniture, housewares etc



New motor vehicles



Clothing, footwear & personal accessories



Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics & toiletries



Alcoholic beverages



Renovations



Note: First six charts (from left) are retail sales; new motor vehicles are numbers of vehicles sold; renovations are the value of alterations and additions to residential dwellings approved by local governments. *Sources:* ABS, Retail Trade, Australia, September 2021 (October data will be released on 2nd December); Building Approvals, Australia, September 2021; Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries VFACTS (seasonal adjustment of Vfacts data by Corinna). Return to "What's New".

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Business confidence again rose strongly in October as New South Wales and then Victoria came out of lockdown

Business confidence

Business confidence, states and territories





Sources: National Australia Bank *Monthly Business Survey*, October 2021; November survey results will be released on 8th December. Return to "What's New".

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The improvement in actual business conditions in October was more modest, though there was an encouraging strong rise in forward orders

Trading conditions



Forward orders



Employee hiring intentions



Profitability



Capacity utilization



Capital expenditure intentions



Note: Quarterly data up to March 1997 (May 2002 for capex intentions), monthly thereafter.

Source: National Australia Bank *Monthly Business Survey*, October 2021; November survey results will be released on 8th December. Return to "What's New".

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Employment fell another 46K in October, and the unemployment rose 0.6 pc pt to 5.2%, with the October survey pre-dating Victoria's re-opening

Employment



Labour force participation rate



Under-employment ratio



Total hours worked



Unemployment rate



'Under-utilization' rate



Source: ABS, *Labour Force, Australia*, October 2021. November data will be released on 16th December. Return to "What's New".

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The October labour force survey picked up the easing of restrictions in NSW, but not the (later) easing in Victoria

Employment



Hours worked



Participation rates



Unemployment rates



Source: ABS, *Labour Force, Australia*, October 2021. November data will be released on 12th November. Return to "What's New".

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The ‘effective’ unemployment rate remained unchanged at 10.3% in May, despite the rise in the ‘official’ rate

Alternative measures of unemployment



- The number of people counted as ‘employed’ but who worked zero hours for ‘economic reasons’ (no or insufficient work, or ‘stood down’) rose by 4½K in October (Victoria up 22½K, rest of Australia down 18K)
- The number of people counted as ‘employed’ but who worked zero hours for ‘other reasons’ (apart from being leave) fell by 64K in October (after a 108K decline in September), of which 49K was in NSW & 12K in the ACT
- The number of people who have ‘dropped out’ of the labour force (as indicated by the fall in the partici-pation rate since May) fell 27K in October, to 333K
  - many if not most of these appear to be people who have ‘worked zero hours’ for more than 4 weeks and are hence classified as ‘not in the labour force’ if they haven’t ‘actively looked for work’
- Most of those who re-entered the labour force in October have yet to regain employment, thus adding to the number of ‘officially’ unemployed
- The ‘effective’ unemployment rate thus remained unchanged at 10.3% in October, up from a low of 5.7% in May
  - but it should drop (probably a lot) in November and December

Source: ABS, *Labour Force, Australia*, October 2021. November data will be released on 12th December.
Return to "What's New“.

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CORINNA ECONOMIC ADVISORY
INDEPENDENT ECONOMICS

Payroll jobs rose by 1.3% over the first two weeks of October, reversing more than half the job losses during the previous 15 weeks of lockdown

Level and weekly change in the number of payroll jobs



Payroll jobs by State & Territory





Source: ABS, Weekly Payroll Jobs and Wages in Australia. Data refers to the number of payroll jobs at businesses participating in the Australian Taxation Office's Single Touch Payroll system, which covers 99% of employers with 20 or more employees and about 71% of smaller employees. People with two or more jobs (about 6% of the total) are double-counted; employers and the self-employed are not included. Data are not seasonally adjusted (so at least some of the week-to-week variations could be due to 'normal' seasonal factors): and the two most recent weeks are subject to (what have often been large) revisions. Return to "What's New".

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The same sectors, and the same groups, that were hardest hit in last year's lockdowns have been hardest hit in the latest one (plus agriculture)

Net change in payroll jobs between week ended 3rd July and week ended 16th October

By industry



By gender and age



Source: ABS, *Weekly Payroll Jobs and Wages in Australia*. Data refers to the number of payroll jobs at businesses participating in the Australian Taxation Office's Single Touch Payroll system, which covers 99% of employers with 20 or more employees and about 71% of smaller employees. People with two or more jobs (about 6% of the total) are double-counted; employers and the self-employed are not included. Data are not seasonally adjusted (so at least some of the week-to-week variations could be due to 'normal' seasonal factors): and the two most recent weeks are subject to (what have often been large) revisions. Return to "What's New".

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The number of people receiving ‘unemployment benefits’ fell to a new post-pandemic low in the week of October (despite lockdowns)

Number of people receiving or seeking Newstart/ JobSeeker or Youth Allowance payments



Jobless income support beneficiaries and labour force survey unemployed as a pc of the labour force



- **Ministers receive weekly data on the number of people on JobSeeker and Youth Allowance (Other) benefits – which since late July last year the Department of Social Services has made this available every second week to the Senate Select Committee examining the Government's responses to Covid-19**
- **The number of people receiving JobSeeker or Youth Allowance (Other) payments fell by 10,009 (0.9%) over the two weeks to 8th October – to its lowest level since the week ended 20th March last year – with more than half the decline occurring in New South Wales and Queensland**
- **People displaced from employment as a result of recent lockdowns have been entitled to receive a range of other payments from the Federal or state governments, though these have now tapered off as vaccination rates reach national targets and restrictions are eased**

Sources: Department of Social Services, *JobSeeker Payment and Youth Allowance Recipients - monthly profile*, ABS; Senate Select Committee on Covid-19, *Additional documents*. Return to "What's New".

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Younger workers bore the brunt of job losses during the early stages of the pandemic and have had a more difficult time regaining jobs

Composition of employment by age group, February 2020



Change in employment between February 2020 and September 2021, by age group



- **People aged 15-24 accounted for 15% of pre-covid employment but experienced 39% of all job losses between February and May last year – and 54% of all job losses between June and September this year – their employment is down 10.1% from the pre-pandemic peak in February last year**
- **Likewise 25-34 year-olds accounted for 25% of all job losses between February and May last year, and for 29% of all job losses between June and August this year – their employment is down 4.6% from February last year**
- **By contrast most older age groups have fared much better, in particular 35-44 year-olds, and the (relatively smaller number of) people aged 60 and over**

Note: data on employment by age group is not seasonally adjusted. *Source:* ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, August 2021: September data will be released on 21st October. Return to "What's New".

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Workers in low-pay industries experienced the bulk of job losses during the downturn and the greatest difficulty regaining them since then

Composition of employment by industry ranked by average weekly earnings, February 2020



Change in employment by industry

February-May 2020

February 2020 – August 2021



- ❑ **Industries with average earnings which are 10% or more below average accounted for 27½% of the pre-pandemic workforce, but experienced 64% of the job losses between February and May last year – and 89% of job losses between May and August this year – employment in these industries was down 2.9% between February last year and August this year**
- ❑ **By contrast employment in "high pay" industries (17% of the pre-pandemic workforce) was 4.9% higher in August than it had been in February last year**

Source: ABS, [Labour Force, Australia, Detailed](), August 2021 and [Average Weekly Earnings, Australia](), November 2019. Labour force survey data on employment by occupation are available only for the middle month of each quarter: November data will be released on 23rd December. [Return to "What's New"]().

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Community & personal service workers, sales workers and labourers have borne the brunt of job losses since the onset of the pandemic

Employment by major occupation category, February 2020



Change in employment between February 2020 and August 2021, by occupation



- **Community & personal services workers, sales workers and labourers accounted for 29% of the pre-covid work force, but experienced 73% of the job losses between February and May last year – and for 73% (again) of job losses between May and August this year – and there were 7.2% fewer of them in August than in February last year**
- **… whereas there are 5.2% more employed managers and professionals than there were in February last year**

Source: ABS, [*Labour Force, Australia, Detailed*](), August 2021. Labour force survey data on employment by occupation are available only for the middle month of each quarter: November data will be released on 23rd December. [Return to "What's New"]().

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Contrary to popular belief neither casual jobs nor 'gig economy' jobs have become more commonplace during the past two decades

'Casual' employees (those without any kind of paid leave entitlement) as a pc of total



- **Casual employment increased significantly as a share of the total during the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s but has not changed significantly since then – except for a sharp drop during the current recession**

Owner-managers of unincorporated enterprises with no employees as a pc of total employment



- **'Independent contractors' have actually declined as a share of the workforce since the early 2000s – had haven't increased during the current recession**

Note: data on casual employment are for August between 1984 and 2008; for November between 2009 and 2013; and for the middle month of each quarter since then; data on owner-managers are for the middle month of each quarter. *Sources:* ABS, Characteristics of Employment, Australia, and earlier equivalents; Labour Force, Australia, Detailed; and Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, Australia. Return to "What's New".

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Job vacancies have rebounded swiftly from their recession lows – there are now fewer than two jobseekers for every vacancy, a record low

Measures of job vacancies



Ratio of unemployed people to job vacancies

- ❑ **Job advertisements and vacancies fell only slightly during the NSW and Victorian lockdowns, and have rebounded strongly in October**
- ❑ **The ratio of unemployed people to the number of job vacancies remain close to a record low in August**

Sources: Australian Government, Labour Market Information Portal; ANZ Research; ABS, *Job Vacancies, Australia*. Return to "What's New".

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There's no evidence of a US-style 'Great Resignation' in Australia – especially when allowance is made for retirements

Proportion of employees who don't expect to be with their current employer or business in 12 months' time



Reasons for not expecting to be with their current employer or business in 12 months' time



Note: 'other reasons' for not expecting to be with current employer or business in 12 months' time include employer closing or down-sizing; study, travel or family reasons; and the seasonal, casual or temporary characteristics of current employment. *Source:* ABS, Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, Table 17, August 2021.

Business capex increased by 4.4% in Q2, the third consecutive rise, this time led by utilities and services sectors

Real business new fixed capital expenditure



Real business new fixed capex, by industry, Q1



Real business new fixed capex, by state, Q2 2021



Real business new fixed capex, by asset, Q1



Note: the ABS Survey of New Capital Expenditure excludes the agriculture, forestry & fishing, and public administration & defence sectors, and superannuation funds.

Source: ABS, *Private New Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure, Australia*; March quarter data will be released on 25th November. Return to "What's New".

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Business capex fell by 1.5% in 2021-22 and is expected to increase by 13½% in 2021-22 according to the latest capex intentions survey

Capital expenditure intentions - mining



Capital expenditure intentions – non-mining



Note: The ABS conducts six surveys of business' capital expenditure intentions in respect of each financial year. The first is conducted in January & February prior to the commencement of the financial year, the second in May & June, the third in July & August of the financial year, the fourth in October & November, the fifth in January & February of the financial year, and the sixth in May & June. The outcome (actual capital expenditure in the financial year) is determined from the survey taken in July & August after the end of the financial year. From the December quarter 2020 the survey includes the education & training, and health care & social assistance sectors. The estimates shown above are in nominal terms.

Source: ABS, *Private New Capital Expenditure and Expected Expenditure, Australia* (next update is released on 25th November). Return to "What's New".

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The Tax Office's latest 'tax gap' estimates again show that small businesses, not big ones or rich families, that are the least compliant with the tax law

Share of total income-based 'tax gap' by class of taxpayer, 2018-19



Share of theoretical tax liability paid voluntarily and after ATO amendments, 2018-19



- **Small businesses account for 49% of the total 'gap' between what the ATO collected in 2018-19 from various income-based taxes and what it estimates it would have collected given 100% compliance with the tax law – cf. large corporates 10% and high wealth individuals 3%**
- **Small businesses pay a smaller proportion of the tax which the ATO estimates they 'should' than either large corporates or high net worth individuals – contrary to the popular perception that the latter two are the groups least likely to be paying their 'fair share' of tax**

Note: 'small' businesses are those with income of up to $10mn; medium businesses are those with income of up to $250mn; and large corporates those with income of over $250mn. 'High wealth' individuals are those who (with associates) control wealth of more than $50mn. *Source:* Australian Taxation Office, Annual Report 2020-21.
Disclosure: Saul Eslake is a member of the ATO's Tax Gap Independent Expert Panel which provides advice on the suitability of the ATO's gap estimates and methodologies.
Return to "What's New".

None of the generous tax preferences accorded to small business does anything to boost employment, productivity or innovation

Employment by size of business



Productivity by size of business



Innovation by size of business



Note: 'Small' businesses in ABS statistics are those with fewer than 20 employees; 'medium' businesses are those with between 20 and 199 employees; and 'large' businesses are those with 200 or more employees. *Sources:* ABS, Characteristics of Australian Business, 2019-20 (and earlier publications); Corinna.

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Consumer confidence rose 0.7 pc pt in November, after a 1.6 pc pt fall in October, and remains below where it was just before the recent lockdowns

Consumer confidence index

Household finances assessment

Buying conditions assessment



Economic conditions assessment



Confidence by housing tenure



Source: Westpac Banking Corporation. December consumer confidence will be released on 9th December . Return to "What's New".

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Household incomes have been supported by government payments, but spending has been curtailed, so households have lots of savings to spend

Household income and spending



Sources of household income



Household saving ratio



Household bank deposits



Sources: ABS, *Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product*, March quarter 2021; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, *Monthly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Statistics*. Return to "What's New".

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Household net worth has risen by $2.2trn (19½%) since the end of 2019, while debt service payments have fallen as a pc of income

Sources of gains in household net worth, Q4 2019 to Q2 2021



Household net debt and interest payments as a percentage of disposable income



Sources: ABS, *Finance and Wealth Accounts*, June quarter 2021; RBA, *Statistical Tables* E1 & E2. September quarter data will be released on 16th December.
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Retail sales volumes fell more in Q3 than they did in Q2 last year – even though only half the country was locked down

Monthly retail sales



Level of retail sales



New motor vehicle sales



Retail sales – NSW, Vic & the rest



Quarterly retail sales volumes



Vehicle sales – NSW, Vic & the rest



Note: see also slide 95 for more detail on the composition of retail sales since the onset of the pandemic. *Sources:* ABS, *Retail Trade, Australia*; Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries *VFACTS* (seasonal adjustment of FCAI data by Corinna). October retail sales data will be released on 26th November; November motor vehicle sales data will be released in the second week of December. Return to "What's New".

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INDEPENDENT ECONOMICS

The most recent lockdowns have prompted a renewed surge in online spending and accelerated trends away from the use of cash

Growth in online retail sales



ATM cash withdrawals



Credit card cash advances



Online retail 'market share'



Debit card cash-outs



Direct entry payments



Sources: ABS, Retail Trade, Australia; RBA, Statistical Tables, C1, C2, C4 and C6. Latest data are for August: October online retail sales data will be published on 2nd December; while September payments system data will be released on 8th December. Return to "What's New".

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Property prices rose another 1.5% in October, the smallest increase since January, to be 19¾% above their pre-covid peak

Residential property prices



Residential property sales volumes



Residential rents



Property prices by tier



Vendor discounting



Capital city rental vacancy rates



Note: The index of property prices measures the 'organic' change in underlying sales values by using a hedonic regression methodology that takes account of changes in the characteristics of properties being sold from month to month. Property price data shown here are seasonally adjusted. The index of residential rents uses a similar methodology to measure the 'organic' change in underlying rents. The 'modelled' sales volume estimates seek to account for delays in receiving information on transactions that have yet to settle (which can be more than six weeks after the contract date). Latest data are for September (except for vacancy rates which is September). November prices, sales volumes and rents data will be released on 1st December. *Sources:* CoreLogic; SQM Research. Return to "What's New".

Prices in Adelaide, Canberra and Hobart, and regional NSW, Victoria, Qld and Tasmania are all more than 20% above their pre-pandemic peaks

New South Wales



Queensland



Western Australia



Northern Territory



Victoria



South Australia



Tasmania



Australian Capital Territory



Note: The index of property prices measures the 'organic' change in underlying sales values by using a hedonic regression methodology that takes account of changes in the characteristics of properties being sold from month to month. Property price data are seasonally adjusted. Latest data are October; November data will be released on 1st December. *Source:* CoreLogic. Return to "What's New".

Lending to property investors and to existing home-owners ‘trading up’ has risen sharply in recent months while FHBs are again being ‘squeezed out’

Housing finance commitments



Interest-only loans as pc of total



Loans to investors as a pc of total



Lending to first home buyers



High LVR loans as a pc of total



Non-performing mortgage loans



Sources: ABS, Lending Indicators; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Quarterly authorised deposit-taking institution statistics. October housing finance data will be released on 2nd December; APRA data on ADI property exposures for the September quarter will be released on 7th December. Return to "What's New".

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Residential building approvals fell 4¼% in September, with a 16% fall in approvals of detached dwellings to the lowest level since last August

Large builders' new home sales



Building approvals, by type



Dwellings under construction



Residential building approvals



Alterations & additions approved



'Pipeline' of work yet to be started



Note: 'New home sales' are of detached dwellings only and exclude small-scale builders. *Sources:* ABS, Building Approvals; Housing Industry Association. October building approvals data will be released on 30th November; September quarter dwellings under construction and 'pipeline' data on 19th January. Return to "What's New".

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Commodity prices were mostly lower this week – especially iron ore (↓4¾%) and thermal coal (↓9¾%) to levels 61% and 48% below earlier peaks

Brent crude oil



Metallurgical coal



Aluminium

Beef



Iron ore



Thermal coal



Gold



Wool



Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; Meat & Livestock Australia; Australian Wool Innovation. Data up to 12th November. Return to "What's New".

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Australia's trade surplus shrank by \$2½bn to a still large \$12¼bn in September, largely due to a 22½% fall in the value of iron ore exports

Iron ore and coal exports



Merchandise exports and imports



Tourism-related services trade



LNG and gold exports



Merchandise trade balance



Tourism services trade balance



Source: ABS, *International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia*, September 2021. October data will be released on 2nd December. Return to "What's New".

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Australia continues to run a large trade surplus with China despite China's sanctions against a range of Australian exports, thanks to iron ore

Merchandise exports – East Asia



Merchandise exports – US & Europe



Merchandise exports – other



Goods trade balance – East Asia



Goods trade balance – US & Europe



Goods trade balance – other



Note: 'Other East Asia' includes Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and ASEAN. 'Europe' includes the EU, UK and Switzerland. 'Other' includes India, New Zealand and the Pacific, Canada, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and others not included in the foregoing. Latest data are for August. *Source:* ABS , International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, September 2021. October data will be released on 2nd December. Return to "What's New".

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The bilateral relationship between Australia and its largest trading partner China seems unlikely to improve any time soon and could get worse

Australia's merchandise exports to China, 2019-20



Note: 'Wood' includes wood products; 'dairy' includes milk, cream, butter & cheese; 'seafood' includes crustaceans, fish and processed seafood; 'other' includes confidential items.
Sources: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trade Statistical Pivot Tables; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

- **China accounted for 39½% of Australia's merchandise exports in FY 2019-20 (the largest proportion any country has since the mid-1950s when 36% of Australia's exports went to the UK)**
  - of which iron ore & concentrates accounts for 56%
- **China also accounted for 19% of Australia's services exports in CY 2019 of which tourism & education accounted for over 90%)**
- **China has no real alternatives to Australian iron ore in the near term – but it has been progressively expanding the range of other Australian products subject to discriminatory tariffs, "customs inspections", quarantine issues or outright bans – including wheat, wool, copper ores, sugar, lobsters, timber, wine and coal**
  - Australia's exports of these products to China have dropped from about $25bn in 2019 to an annualized rate of about $5½bn since the sanctions were imposed – although in many cases Australian exporters have been able to find alternative markets (see next slide)
- **In July China's Foreign Ministry openly acknowledged that it was seeking to 'punish' Australia for "groundlessly accusing and smearing China and undermining China's core interests based on ideology" and "acting as a cat's paw" for the United States – a view likely to intensify after last month's announcement of a new defence pact with the US and UK**
- **Another looming flashpoint in the bilateral relationship may come from the forthcoming review (by the Defence Department) of the 2015 lease of the Port of Darwin to a Chinese company (Landbridge)**

China's trade boycott of Australia is affecting everything except iron ore, gold, base metals, wool, wheat and dairy products

Australian exports to China, ten months to August 2021 compared with ten months to August 2020



Note: 'confidential items includes, in particular, LNG. *Source:* Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade Statistical Pivot Tables - Country and commodity pivot table monthly; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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"With friends like these …" – how Australia's 'allies' have been 'cutting our lunch' in trade with China

China's imports of selected products, by origin – January-July 2021 compared with January-July 2020

Coal



Copper ores



Beef



Barley



Wine



Crustaceans



Wood & wood products



Source: China General Administration of Customs; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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China can cause Australia economic pain because we're very dependent on it, and are one of the few countries with whom China runs a deficit

Merchandise exports to China as a pc of total



Merchandise imports from China as a pc of total



China's bilateral merchandise trade balances



Sources: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics*; Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Trade. Return to "What's New".

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Domestic aviation picked up strongly between last November and May – but has since slumped with the lockdowns and tighter arrivals caps

Short-term visitor arrivals and resident returns



Airport passenger movements



Note: The ABS has suspended publication of seasonally adjusted estimates of short-term visitor arrivals and resident returns, so published original estimates for April 2020 (and beyond) have been seasonally adjusted by Corinna using the same seasonal factors as for the corresponding month of 2019. Latest ABS data on arrivals and departures are for August; BITRE data on airport passenger movements are for August; September 2021 estimate(e)has been extrapolated from data for Sydney Airport published by Sydney Airport Ltd. *Sources:* ABS; Bureau of Industry, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE); Sydney Airport Ltd; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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Australia recorded another record current account surplus in the June quarter, thanks to another large gain in export prices

Export and import volumes



Goods & services trade balances



Capital flows



Export and import prices



Current account balance



Net international investment position



Note: The chart of Australia's international capital flows shows inflows (eg borrowings from abroad) as a positive and outflows (eg repayments of debt, or purchases of foreign equity assets)as a negative. Likewise the chart of Australia's international investment position shows net foreign debt as a positive and net equity assets as a negative. Latest data are for the June quarter 2021; September quarter data will be released on 30th November. *Source:* ABS, *Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, Australia*. Return to "What's New".

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The A$ dropped below US74¢ (and briefly below 73¢) this week dragged down by a stronger US$, lower iron ore prices and narrower yield spreads

A$-US$ and US$ trade-weighted index



A$-US$ and US equity market volatility



A$-US$ and spot iron ore prices

A$-US$ and Australia-US 10-year bond yield spread



Note: The DXY is an index of the value of the US dollar against 6 other currencies (the euro, yen, pound, Canadian dollar, Swedish krona and Swiss franc). The VIX index is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P500 options and is widely interpreted as an indicator of investor risk appetite or aversion. *Source:* Refinitiv Datastream. Data up to 12th November. Return to "What's New".

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The A$ was also weaker against most third currencies (other than the euro, sterling and NZ$), falling more than 1% against the won, yuan and rupiah

A$ vs Japanese yen



A$ vs Chinese yuan



A$ vs Indo rupiah



A$ vs Euro



A$ vs NZ$



A$ vs Korean won



A$ vs Singapore $



A$ vs Canadian $



A$ vs British pound



A$ TWI



Note: The 'TWI' is the RBA's trade-weighted index of the A$. *Source:* Refinitiv Datastream. Data up to 12th November. Return to "What's New".

The 'headline' CPI rose 0.8% in Q3, as expected, but 'underlying' inflation surprised rising 0.7%, pushing the annual rate above 2%

Consumer prices



New dwelling purchase costs



Automotive fuel prices



Supply-chain affected prices



- The CPI rose 0.8%, as expected, in Q3, with the annual rate (which had been inflated in Q2 by 'base effects' especially from free child care in Q2 last year) falling from 3.8% to 3.0%
- But the statistical measures of 'underlying' rose a larger-than-expected 0.7%, the biggest quarterly increase since Q4 2013, pushing the annual 'underlying' inflation rate to 2.1%, the first time it has been inside the RBA's target band since Q4 2015
- 0.28 pc pts (or 37%) of the 0.8% rise in the CPI in Q3 came from a 3.3% increase in new dwelling purchase costs (would have been 6.5% but for the impact of government grants)
- 0.25 pc pts (33%) of the Q3 increase came from a 24.6% increase in petrol prices, 0.09 pc pts (12%) from increased prices for meals out and take-away foods, and 0.08 pc pts (11%) from supply-chain affected items such as furniture and cars
- The larger-than-expected rise in measures of 'underlying' inflation (which exclude these 'outliers') is partly due to an unusually small number of items experiencing price falls

Note: 'Underlying' inflation is the average of the weighted median and trimmed mean CPIs. Wage price indices exclude bonuses.
Sources: ABS, Consumer Price Index, Australia. The December quarter (Q4) CPI will be released on 25th January. Return to "What's New".

'Upstream' price pressures, which had been less apparent in Australia than elsewhere earlier this year, intensified during the September quarter

Producer price index



Manufacturing input & output prices



Imported consumer goods prices



Construction input & output prices



- **Until the September quarter there had been very little evidence in Australia of the 'upstream' inflation pressure apparent in many other economies – with the exception of the construction sector**
- **However the producer price index (which in Australia includes a range of services sectors, but excludes exports) rose by 1.1% in Q3 – the largest increase in eight years**
  - which after a 0.7% increase in Q2 pushed the annual PPI inflation rate to 2.9%, the highest since Q4 2011
  - the manufacturing sector contributed 36% Q3 PPI increase, and the construction sector a further 31%
  - sea freight transport services prices rose 43% in Q3 (and by 105% from Q3 last year) although this only accounted for 1½% of the increase in the overall PPI in Q3
- **The import price index rose 5.4% in Q3, the largest increase since Q3 2013**
  - a 57% increase in prices of imported petroleum products was the largest contributor
  - but imported consumer goods prices also rose 4.1%, the largest in eight years

Sources: ABS, *Producer Price Indexes, Australia* and International Trade Price Indexes, Australia, September quarter 2021.

Return to "What's New".

Unlike the US there's very little evidence of a pick-up in wages growth in Australia – this week's Q3 wages data will be closely scrutinized

Wage price index – all sectors



WPI excl. temporary wage cuts



Enterprise bargaining agreements



WPI – private vs public sectors



WPI and 'underlying' CPI inflation



Unit labour costs



Note: Unit labour costs is compensation of employees (including fringe benefits and social insurance contributions) per hour worked divided by (real) gross value added per hour worked (ie, labour productivity) for the non-farm sector. *Sources:* ABS, *Wage Price Index, Australia* and *Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product*; Attorney-General's Department, *Trends in Federal Enterprise Bargaining*; September quarter WPI data will released on 17th November. Return to "What's New".

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Australia’s fiscal and monetary policy settings

The Government's fiscal policy response to Covid-19 now exceeds 18% of GDP – compared with the 'advanced' economy average of 11¼%

Fiscal policy responses to Covid-19 – selected 'advanced economies



Note: 'Above the line' measures comprise additional or accelerated spending and deferred or foregone revenue. 'Below the line' measures comprise equity injections, loans, asset purchases and debt assumptions, but do not include loan guarantees or other contingent liabilities. 'DMs' means 'developed markets' (or 'advanced economies'). Data includes measures announced up until 27th September 2021. *Source:* IMF, *Fiscal Monitor Database of Country Fiscal Measures in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic*, October 2021. Return to "What's New".

- **Policy measures announced by the Australian and state/territory governments in response to Covid-19 (up to end-September this year) have been equivalent to more than 18% of GDP – the fifth highest of any 'advanced' economy, according to new IMF estimates released last month**
- **In response to the protracted lockdowns in NSW, Victoria and the ACT (and shorter ones in the NT, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania), the Federal Government paid out just under $13bn to almost 2½mn people displaced from employment by restrictions, or forced into quarantine or self-isolation**
  - of which $7.5bn was paid to people in NSW, $4.4bn to people in Victoria, and $344mn to people in the ACT
  - state and territory governments also made payments to businesses and individuals affected by health restrictions
- **These payments have now largely ceased**
  - only $274mn has been paid over the first two weeks of November, cf. $3.2bn in October, $4.4bn in September and $5.1bn in July-August

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The budget deficit is declining rapidly despite the additional payments to people affected by lockdowns, thanks to buoyant tax revenues

Australian Government revenue and expenses



Australian Government 'underlying' cash balance



Australian Government net debt



Note: Revenue and expenses are accrual accounting items. The 'underlying' cash balance is (cash) receipts minus payments, excluding transactions in financial assets for policy purposes and net earnings of the Future Fund. Net debt is total interest-bearing liabilities (government securities, deposits, loans and other borrowing) minus cash and deposits, advances paid, and (interest-bearing) loans, placements and investments. *Source:* Australian Government, *Final Budget Outcome 2020-21*; Department of Finance, Commonwealth Monthly Financial Statements. Return to "What's New".

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Analysis by the Parliamentary Budget Office suggests the debt which the Government has incurred *is* sustainable under a wide range of scenarios

PBO projections of Commonwealth Government gross debt



PBO projections of Commonwealth Government interest payments



- **The PBO derived projections of gross debt and interest payments over the next 40 years based on 27 combinations of different assumptions about economic growth, interest rates and the budget balance**
- **Under all of these scenarios (even the 'worst case'), both total debt and debt-servicing costs remain within the bounds of historical experience**

Source: Parliamentary Budget Office, *Beyond the Budget: Fiscal outlook and scenarios*, 21st September 2021. Return to "What's New".

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Australia's problem is that the Government will be relying solely on rising personal income tax collections to keep the deficit on a declining path

Commonwealth Government receipts and payments



Personal income tax and other tax receipts as pc of GDP



Personal income tax receipts as a pc of total tax receipts

Source: Parliamentary Budget Office, *Beyond the Budget: Fiscal outlook and scenarios*, 21st September 2021. Return to "What's New".

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And the prospective increase in personal income tax collections *isn't* the result of a conscious policy decision, but is rather due to 'bracket creep'

Average personal income tax rate



Source of changes in average personal income tax rates



Source: Parliamentary Budget Office, *Bracket creep and its fiscal impact*, 29th September 2021. Return to "What's New".

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‘Bracket creep’ disproportionately impacts taxpayers with incomes of between $20,000 and $50,000 per annum

Change in average tax rates between 2021-22 and 2031-32 by taxable income percentile



Source: Parliamentary Budget Office, *Beyond the Budget: Fiscal outlook and scenarios*, 21st September 2021. Return to "What's New".

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The Government continues to find a ready appetite for its bond issuance – so far this fiscal year it's received $180bn of bids for $38bn of bonds

Australian government bond issuance since March 2020



- Since 30th March 2020, the Australian Office of Financial Management has issued $335bn of Treasury bonds – based on the volume of bids received it could have borrowed more than $1.27 trn with yields at most 4 bp (0.04 of a pc point) above the highest yields actually accepted
- This week the AOFM sold $1bn of 4-year bonds at an average yield of 1.31%, and $1bn of 9¾-year bonds at an average yield of 1.70%, as well as $150mn of 6-year indexed bonds at an average yield of -0.85%
  - It received bids totalling $9.8bn for these bonds, including almost $6½bn of bids for the 4-year bond
- So far this financial year, the AOFM has received bids totalling more than $180bn for the $38bn of bonds it has offered for sale – a 'coverage ratio' of 4.8 times, cf. 3¾ times during the 2020-21 financial year

Source: Australian Office of Financial Management data hub; Corinna. Return to "What's New".

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As expected, the RBA formally abandoned its 3-year bond yield target at this month's Board meeting, but pushed back on any rate hike in 2022

Reserve Bank cash rate



Reserve Bank assets as a pc of GDP



Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Tables A3 and F1.1.

Return to "What's New".

- ❑ At its November Board meeting the RBA left the cash rate at 0.10% and maintained its bond purchase program at $4bn per week until "at least mid-February 2022" – but formally abandoned its 0.10% target for the April 2024 bond
- ❑ In an (unusual) post-meeting statement Governor Philip Lowe explained that the 3-year bond yield target's "effectiveness as a monetary policy tool [had] declined as expectations about future interest rates shifted due to the run of data and the forecast progress towards [the RBA's] goals"
  - – the "balance of probabilities" around the timing of any increase in the cash rate is now "a little different" from what it had been when the target was introduced ("in the exceptional days of March 2020")
- ❑ While the RBA sees its latest forecasts (published in the November Statement on Monetary Policy and summarized in slide 92) – including upward revisions to its forecasts for inflation – as still being consistent with the first increase in the cash rate being in 2024, it now also acknowledges that "it is also possible that an earlier move will be appropriate"
- ❑ Governor Lowe sought to clarify the RBA's 'guidance' as to the timing of any future cash rate increase as "in no way … constitut[ing] a *promise* that the cash rate would remain unchanged to any particular date"
  - – but he was also emphatic that "the latest data and forecasts do not warrant an increase in the cash rate in 2022" (as has been priced by markets)

Money and bond markets are still pricing at least one increase in the RBA's cash rate next year, despite the RBA's view that it's "not warranted"

Overnight index swap rates



Yield curves



- **Short-term money markets are still pricing at least one increase in the RBA cash rate next year, despite the RBA's insistence that such a move "isn't warranted" (slide 92) – but they're no longer giving much credence to the chance of two rate increases (as they were at the end of October)**
- **However 2-year bond yield pricing suggests that markets expect that there will be at least one further rate increase in 2023, after the one priced for next year**

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia; Refinitiv Datastream. Data up to 12th November. Return to "What's New".`

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After falling sharply following last week's RBA Board meeting, bond yields rose (albeit modestly) following Wednesday's US October inflation data

RBA open market bond purchases



Interest rates



- Australian bond yields rose in line with US yields following the higher-than-expected US inflation data for October released on Wednesday night (Australian time), after falling steeply last week after the RBA sought to 'hose down' market expectations of a series of increases in the cash rate in 2022 (which markets are still pricing, but not quite as strongly as at the end of October)
- The 10-year yield finished at 1.81%, up from 1.75% on Monday but well below the most recent peak of 2.09% at end-October
- The RBA again bought $4bn of bonds under its Bond Purchase Program – bringing its cumulative purchases to just under $238bn (or $316bn including purchases under the 3-year yield target program which the RBA formally abandoned at its Board meeting earlier this month)

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, *Statistical Tables* A3 and F2. Data up to 12th November. Return to "What's New".

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Banks have played an important role in assisting borrowers cope with shutdowns, and have been swamped with deposits

Business credit outstanding



Monthly change in bank deposits



- Banks have cut interest rates on small business loans by more than the official cash rate since June 2019 (when the RBA started cutting rates again)
- Banks have made credit readily available when needed – in the early stages of the pandemic and during the most recent lockdowns
- Banks extended 'repayment holidays' to business and home mortgage borrowers who requested it
  - in May last year, 11% of mortgage borrowers and 18% of SME borrowers were deferring debt service payments
- Bank deposits have swelled by $424bn (20%) since February last year as customers have 'parked' precautionary loan drawings, additional savings and withdrawals from superannuation funds
  - almost all of this has gone into transaction deposits which don't pay interest – so banks haven't drawn as much as might otherwise have been expected from the RBA's Term Funding Facility
- Household deposits have risen by $208bn (21%) since last February – including by $67bn during the September quarter most of which NSW and Victoria spent in lockdown – while business deposits have risen by $142bn (24%)

Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia; APRA. Return to "What's New".

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The RBA has (indirectly) absorbed almost two-thirds of the increase in government debt since the end of 2019, banks 2% and foreigners 31%

Holders of Australian Government bonds



Australian Gov't bonds on issue have increased by $237bn since the end of 2019 – of which $173bn (73%) have been absorbed by the RBA, and $72bn by foreigners, while banks have reduced their holdings by $7bn

Nationality of Australian Government bond holders



Domestic holdings of Australian Gov't bonds (including RBA) rose by $57bn over the 12 months to June while identified foreign holdings fell $7bn – although unidentified holdings (which include many foreigners) rose by $85bn

Holders of State and Territory Government bonds



State & Territory Gov't bonds on issue increased have increased by $107bn since the end of 2019, of which $45bn have been absorbed by banks, $40bn by the RBA and $29bn by foreigners

Sources: ABS, *Finance and Wealth Accounts*; Australian Office of Financial Management. September quarter data will be released on 16th December.
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New Zealand

Business and consumer confidence have fallen after last month's rate hike, the sharp rise in inflation in Q3, and NZ's protracted lockdown

Real GDP



Consumer confidence



Dwelling 'consents' (permits)



Contributions to GDP growth



Business confidence



Population growth



Note: New Zealand uses GDP(P) as its preferred measure of GDP. September GDP data will be released on 16th December.
Sources: Statistics NZ; ANZ-Roy Morgan; ANZ Bank NZ. Return to "What's New".

Employment rose another 2.0% in Q3, to be 3.2% above its pre-pandemic peak, cutting the unemployment rate to 3.4%, the lowest since Q4 2007

Employment



Labour force participation rate



Labour force under-utilization rate



Hours worked



Unemployment rate



Average weekly earnings



Note: New Zealand labour force data are only published quarterly. There are two 'headline' series on employment – the household labour force survey (HLFS) which counts the number of people in employment during the quarter; and the quarterly employment survey (QES), which counts the number of 'filled jobs' at 'economically significant enterprises' in the 'reference week' in the middle of the quarter, excluding the self-employed and those working in agriculture and fishing. The labour force under-utilization rate measures those who are unemployed plus those who are employed part-time but working fewer hours than they are able and willing to work.
Source: Statistics NZ. September quarter data will be released on 3rd November. Return to "What's New".

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Although New Zealand's export commodity prices are at a record high, unlike Australia its current account has remained in deficit

Export commodity prices



Merchandise trade balance



Balance of payments



Merchandise exports and imports



Overseas visitor arrivals



Net foreign debt



Note: latest merchandise trade data is for September: October data will be released on 25th November; latest balance of payments and net foreign debt data is for the March quarter; September quarter data will be released on 15th December. *Sources:* ANZ Bank; Statistics New Zealand. Return to "What's New".

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The Q3 CPI was a 'shocker', rising 2.2% (cf. the RBNZ's expectation of 1.4%), pushing the annual 'headline' inflation rate to 4.9%

Consumer prices



Housing costs in the CPI



Components of 'core' inflation



Labour costs



- The CPI rose 2.2% in Q3, the largest q-o-q increase since Q1 2011, after a 1.3% increase in Q2, pushing the annual 'headline' inflation rate up to 4.9%, the highest since Q2 2011 (after GST was raised from 12½% to 15%)
- Six components representing 18¼% of the CPI basket accounted for 66% of the increase in the CPI in Q3
  - a 4.5% increase in new housing costs alone contributed 0.4 pc pts to the Q2 increase (19% of the total), and 1.0 pc pt to the annual rate (21% of the total)
  - other significant contributors were vegetables (up 18.7%), petrol (6.5%), council rates (7.1%), international air fares (66%) and games & toys (18.4%)
- The annual rate of 'core' inflation as measured by the RBNZ's 'sectoral factor model', rose to 2.7% in Q3, the highest since Q1 2009, from 2.2% in Q2
- The RBNZ had been expecting a 1.4% increase in the CPI in Q3

Sources: Statistics NZ ; Reserve Bank of New Zealand. December quarter CPI will be released on 27th January 2022.
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The 2021 NZ Budget uses gains from an improved economic outlook to fund additional spending as well as a slightly improved 'bottom line'

NZ government 'operating balance excluding gains & losses' ('OEBGAL')



NZ 'core Crown debt'



- **As was also the case in Australia, the 2021-22 New Zealand Budget presented by Finance Minister Grant Robertson in May benefited from a much stronger economic performance than had been anticipated in last year's Budget, or in last December's Half-Year Economic & Fiscal Update (HYEFU)**
  - Treasury now expects the NZ economy to have grown 2.9% in 2020-21 (cf. 1.5% in HYEFU) and by 3.7% pa over the following two years (cf. 3.1% in HYEFU)
  - unemployment is expected to fall to 5% in June 2022 and 4.2% by June 2024, instead of increasing to 6.8% in June 2022 and then falling to 4.7% by June 2024
- **The Budget applies most of the revenue windfall from this improved economic outlook (and transfers from unspent allocations to the $50bn Covid Response and Recovery Fund established last year) to fund new spending initiatives totalling almost NZ$20bn over the five years to 2024-25**
  - of which the most significant are increases in benefit payments of up to $55/week (consciously reversing cuts made in the 1990 Budget) and increased spending on health and housing
- **Nonetheless the Budget also reduced the 'OBEGAL' and 'residual cash' deficits for the five years to 2024-25 by $9bn**
  - the 'OBEGAL' deficit is forecast to decline from 2019-20's peak of 7.3% of GDP to 4.5% of GDP in 2020-21, increase slightly to 5.3% of GDP in 2021-22, then decline to 0.6% of GDP in 2024-25 – and to return to surplus by 2026-27
- **As a result 'core Crown net debt' is expected to peak at 48% of GDP in June 2023 (down from 52.6% at HYEFU) and then decline to 43.6% of GDP by June 2025, and longer term to drop below 20% of GDP in 2034**

Note: The measure of the NZ Government budget balance is 'OBEGAL', which stands for 'operating balance excluding gains and losses' (an accrual accounting measure). Net 'core Crown debt' excludes assets of the NZ Super Fund, student loans and other advances, and financial assets held for public policy purposes *Source:* NZ Treasury, Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2021. Return to "What's New".

NZ's housing price boom has been fuelled by investors (a large proportion of them with very high LVRs) – but recent changes have had some impact

House price inflation



Lending to investors as pc of total



Average new mortgage



Mortgage lending growth



High-LVR loans to investors



Loans to FTBs at over 5 times income



Sources: Real Estate Institute of NZ; Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Tables C30, C31 and C40). Return to "What's New".

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As expected, the RBNZ raised its official cash rate by 25 bp at last month's Monetary Policy Committee meeting

- The RBNZ raised its official cash rate by 25 basis points, to 0.50%, at its Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 6th October
  - the MPC was going to raise the OCR at its previous meeting on 18th August, but stayed its hand following the announcement of a nationwide lockdown the day before
  - however at its latest meeting the MPC concluded that the current restrictions "have not materially changed the medium-term outlook for inflation and employment", and that "timely Government support for business and jobs is effective at cushioning the near-term impact on economic activity"
- The decision to raise the OCR was primarily driven by concern about the consequences of 'capacity' pressures for inflation
  - in the MPC's assessment, "rising demand alongside capacity constraints is contributing to higher domestic inflation", accentuated by "higher oil prices, supply shortfalls and rising transport costs", which are expected to result in CPI inflation rising "above 4% in the near term" before returning towards 2% "over the medium term"
  - In its view, "demand shortfalls are less of an issue than the economy hitting capacity constraints given the effectiveness of Government support and resilience of household and business balance sheets"
- The MPC re-iterated its judgement that "the level of house prices is currently unsustainable"
  - although they also noted that "a number of factors are expected to constrain house prices over the medium term", including increased levels of new building, slower population growth, changes in tax policy announced by the Government in March (which came into effect at the beginning of October), and the recent further tightening of macro-prudential restrictions on high-LVR mortgage lending
- The RBNZ foreshadowed further increases in the OCR at future meetings, noting that "monetary policy stimulus will need to be reduced to maintain price stability and maximum sustainable employment over the medium term" and that "further removal of monetary policy stimulus is expected over time"
  - the next Monetary Policy Committee meeting is on 24th November

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New Zealand bond yields resumed their upward movement this week after a pause last week, ahead of the RBNZ meeting on 24th November

RBNZ open market bond purchases



New Zealand interest rates



- **New Zealand bond yields resumed their upward climb this week after taking a 'breather' last week, with the five-year finishing up 10bp at 2.40%, the highest since April 2018, and the ten-year up 14bp to 2.64%, the highest since November 2018, with the 10-year spread over US yields widening to over 100bp for the first time since December 2016**
- **NZ financial markets are giving some credence to the possibility of a 50bp hike in the OCR at the next RBNZ MPC meeting on 24th November**

Note: LGFA = Local Government Financing Authority. *Source:* Reserve Bank of New Zealand, *Statistics* Tables B2 and D3. Data up to 12th November.

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Important information

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